| Revue: | Ludus vitalis |
| Base de datos: | CLASE |
| Número de sistema: | 000365476 |
| ISSN: | 1133-5165 |
| Autores: | Grande-García, Israel1 |
| Instituciones: | 1Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, México, Distrito Federal. México |
| Año: | 2012 |
| Volumen: | 20 |
| Número: | 37 |
| Paginación: | 97-126 |
| País: | México |
| Idioma: | Español |
| Tipo de documento: | Artículo |
| Enfoque: | Teórico, crítico |
| Resumen en inglés | In this paper I offer a new defense of the mind-body identity thesis. The two key arguments are: (1) the causal argument, according to which mental states have no causal influence on our behavior, unless they are identified with physical body/brain states, and (2) biperspectivism or dual-access thesis, which states that we have two access modes or two perspectives to the same physical event: from the first-person perspective and from the third-person perspective. Given this dual-access to only one physical event, we use two different ways of referring it by means of scientific theoretical terms and by the use of the so-called phenomenal concepts. I will also make some critical comments on emergentism and of various erroneous formulations of the identity thesis. Finally, I defend identity against some of the traditional objections, namely, indiscernibility of identicals, Kripke’s objection, the conceivability argument, the knowledge argument, and the explanatory gap |
| Disciplinas: | Filosofía |
| Palabras clave: | Doctrinas y corrientes filosóficas, Filosofía de la mente, Epistemología, Mente-cuerpo, Identidad, Fisicalismo, Conocimiento, Causalidad, Cierre causal |
| Texte intégral: | Texto completo (Ver PDF) |
