| Journal: | Ludus vitalis |
| Database: | CLASE |
| System number: | 000365476 |
| ISSN: | 1133-5165 |
| Authors: | Grande-García, Israel1 |
| Institutions: | 1Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, México, Distrito Federal. México |
| Year: | 2012 |
| Volumen: | 20 |
| Number: | 37 |
| Pages: | 97-126 |
| Country: | México |
| Language: | Español |
| Document type: | Artículo |
| Approach: | Teórico, crítico |
| English abstract | In this paper I offer a new defense of the mind-body identity thesis. The two key arguments are: (1) the causal argument, according to which mental states have no causal influence on our behavior, unless they are identified with physical body/brain states, and (2) biperspectivism or dual-access thesis, which states that we have two access modes or two perspectives to the same physical event: from the first-person perspective and from the third-person perspective. Given this dual-access to only one physical event, we use two different ways of referring it by means of scientific theoretical terms and by the use of the so-called phenomenal concepts. I will also make some critical comments on emergentism and of various erroneous formulations of the identity thesis. Finally, I defend identity against some of the traditional objections, namely, indiscernibility of identicals, Kripke’s objection, the conceivability argument, the knowledge argument, and the explanatory gap |
| Disciplines: | Filosofía |
| Keyword: | Doctrinas y corrientes filosóficas, Filosofía de la mente, Epistemología, Mente-cuerpo, Identidad, Fisicalismo, Conocimiento, Causalidad, Cierre causal |
| Full text: | Texto completo (Ver PDF) |
