| Journal: | Journal of applied economics |
| Database: | CLASE |
| System number: | 000430310 |
| ISSN: | 1667-6726 |
| Authors: | Haga, Mercedes1 |
| Institutions: | 1Universidad Diego Portales, Escuela de Ingeniería Industrial, Santiago de Chile. Chile |
| Year: | 2015 |
| Season: | Nov |
| Volumen: | 18 |
| Number: | 2 |
| Pages: | 267-295 |
| Country: | Argentina |
| Language: | Inglés |
| Document type: | Artículo |
| Approach: | Aplicado |
| English abstract | Using a large panel data set, I find that political budget cycles are significantly smaller in countries with de facto central bank independence (CBI). To explain this result and its consequences in the economy, I develop an extended New Keynesian model that incorporates a political economy model of career concerns. I find that CBI mitigates the incumbent’s fiscal decisions. Intuitively, since increases in the interest rate have a negative effect on the reelection probability due to consumption postponement, this discourages expansionary fiscal policies |
| Disciplines: | Economía, Ciencia política |
| Keyword: | Econometría, Proceso político, Finanzas públicas, Datos de panel, Ciclo político, Presupuesto público, Indicadores financieros, Banco Central, Modelos económicos, Neokeynesianismo, Política fiscal, Decisiones políticas |
| Full text: | Texto completo (Ver PDF) |
