| Journal: | Eidos (Barranquilla) |
| Database: | CLASE |
| System number: | 000435046 |
| ISSN: | 1692-8857 |
| Authors: | Blamauer, Michael1 |
| Institutions: | 1University of Vienna, Department of Philosophy, Viena. Austria |
| Year: | 2011 |
| Season: | Jul-Dic |
| Number: | 15 |
| Pages: | 48-75 |
| Country: | Colombia |
| Language: | Inglés |
| Document type: | Artículo |
| Approach: | Analítico, crítico |
| Spanish abstract | Algunos filósofos de la mente han defendido la idea de considerar la mente como otra característica fundamental de la realidad, además de las propiedades físicas. De ahí que la mayoría de ellos sean propiamente dualistas. Sin embargo, algunos de ellos son pansiquistas. En este artículo sostendré que ser propiamente un dualista implica, en esencia, ser pansiquista. Incluso, si el pansiquismo aborda ciertas dificultades relacionadas con el problema de la conciencia de manera muy elegante, éstas permanecen inmodificables. Siendo partidario del carácter fundamental de la mente, defenderé la idea de que sólo mediante una revisión radical de la metafísica el pansiquista podrá evitar tales problemas y, en consecuencia, que debe adoptar el idealismo leibniciano |
| English abstract | Property-dualism is typically taken to be the view that there are two fundamentally different kinds of properties to be found in the world: mental and physical properties. Both are irreducible to each other, which means that the ontology of physics is not enough to constitute subjective experiential phenomena. However, it is generally agreed that these two basic kinds of properties stand in a somewhat lawful relation to each other, to Chalmers (1996) even if these laws are distinct from the as-yet known natural laws of physics and would therefore expand our physical worldview. The attractiveness of this view derives of course from its compatibility with a widely accepted physical theory about the nature of reality, though it "adds" a further ingredient to the lawful composition of fundamental particles, fields and forces. Being a property dual ist in fact entails not being an eliminative physicalist or reductive materialist, but rather an insistent defender of the idea that mentality in the sense of conscious experience is something fundamental1. Fundamentality is understood in the sense of being essentially irreducible to something else |
| Disciplines: | Filosofía |
| Keyword: | Metafísica, Filosofía de la mente, Idealismo, Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Ontología, Conciencia |
| Full text: | Texto completo (Ver PDF) |
