Credibility, rules and power in the European Union institutions: a transactional analysis of the "Stability and Growth pact"



Título del documento: Credibility, rules and power in the European Union institutions: a transactional analysis of the "Stability and Growth pact"
Revue: Revista de economia politica
Base de datos: CLASE
Número de sistema: 000280372
ISSN: 0101-3157
Autores: 1

Instituciones: 1Universidad de Vigo, Facultad de Economía, Vigo, Pontevedra. España
Año:
Periodo: Jul-Sep
Volumen: 26
Número: 3
Paginación: 445-458
País: Brasil
Idioma: Inglés
Tipo de documento: Artículo
Enfoque: Analítico, descriptivo
Resumen en inglés The credibility of the rules and the elements of power constitute fundamental keys in the analysis of the political institutions. This paper opens the "black box" of the European Union institutions and analyses the problem of credibility in the commitment of the Stability and Growth pact (SGP). This Pact (SGP) constituted a formal rule that tried to enforce budgetary discipline on the European States. Compliance with this contract could be ensured by the existence of "third party enforcement" or by the coincidence of the ex-ante and ex-post interests of the States (reputational capital). The fact is that states such as France or Germany failed to comply with the ruling and managed to avoid the application of sanctions. This article studies the transactions and the hierarchy of power that exists in the European institutions, and analyses the institutional framework included in the new European Constitution
Disciplinas: Ciencia política,
Economía
Palabras clave: Gobierno,
Sistemas económicos,
Europa,
Gobernabilidad,
Instituciones,
Política económica
Texte intégral: Texto completo (Ver HTML)