When and How do Bureaucratic Conflicts Matter in Trade Policy? Evidence from the US Trade Policymaking Process during the Clinton Administration (1993–2001)
Título del documento: When and How do Bureaucratic Conflicts Matter in Trade Policy? Evidence from the US Trade Policymaking Process during the Clinton Administration (1993–2001)
Revista: Contexto internacional
Base de datos: CLASE
Número de sistema: 000454073
ISSN: 0102-8529
Autores: 1
Instituciones: 1Institut de Hautes Etudes Internationales et du Developpement, Ginebra. Suiza
Año:
Periodo: Ene-Abr
Volumen: 39
Número: 1
Paginación: 201-222
País: Brasil
Idioma: Inglés
Tipo de documento: Artículo
Enfoque: Analítico, descriptivo
Resumen en inglés The study of the role played by bureaucracies contributed substantively to the analysis of the domestic determinants of foreign policy outcomes, particularly by softening the premise of the state as a unitary-rational actor. However, the potential of focusing on bureaucracies to analyse US trade policy outcomes has been severely underestimated by the most recent IPE scholarship, which tends to focus on the Congress and interest groups, and to consider the Executive a unitary actor. Based on elements of the bureaucratic politics model, this article uses evidence from the US trade policy during Clinton’s administration (1993–2001) in order to present arguments regarding how and when bureaucratic conflicts matter the most, and highlight the relevance of these conflicts in the trade decision-making process
Disciplinas: Relaciones internacionales
Palabras clave: Política internacional,
Estados Unidos de América,
Política exterior,
Clinton, William J,
Política comercial,
Toma de decisiones
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