El popperiano como un pirrónico: La noción de justificación epistémica en Karl Popper



Document title: El popperiano como un pirrónico: La noción de justificación epistémica en Karl Popper
Journal: Ludus vitalis
Database: CLASE
System number: 000415903
ISSN: 1133-5165
Authors: 1
Institutions: 1Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Departamento de Filosofía, Iztapalapa, Distrito Federal. México
Year:
Volumen: 22
Number: 42
Pages: 103-113
Country: México
Language: Español
Document type: Artículo
Approach: Analítico, descriptivo
English abstract Popper argues in the Logic of Scientific Discovery (published in 1934 in German) against both an externalist and an inter nalist epistemic justification for observational statements; Popper then opts in t he LSD for a position that substitutes the justification of the basic statemen ts of science with their criti - cism; and he stops a regress of criticisms with som e conventional decisions. Later, in the Open Society (1945) he argues for a critical rationalism, one t hat requires some argumentatively unjustified and unjus tifiable presuppositions, i.e., it requires some dogmas. The late Popper (cir ca 1983), seems inclined towards a pancritical rationalism, a position that leads, however, to a logical paradox, which can only be evaded if some presuppos itions are to be accepted as not criticizable. Thus, the Popperian requires e ither some unjustifiable or some uncriticizable presuppositions. These dogmatic presuppositions should be believed passively and judgment about their trut h value should be sus - pended. This is the Popperian’s Pyrrhonian attitude
Disciplines: Filosofía
Keyword: Filosofía de la ciencia,
Doctrinas y corrientes filosóficas,
Racionalismo crítico,
Racionalismo,
Popper, Karl,
Dogmatismo,
Justificación,
Epistemología,
Irracionalismo
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