El popperiano como un pirrónico: La noción de justificación epistémica en Karl Popper



Título del documento: El popperiano como un pirrónico: La noción de justificación epistémica en Karl Popper
Revista: Ludus vitalis
Base de datos: CLASE
Número de sistema: 000415903
ISSN: 1133-5165
Autores: 1
Instituciones: 1Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Departamento de Filosofía, Iztapalapa, Distrito Federal. México
Año:
Volumen: 22
Número: 42
Paginación: 103-113
País: México
Idioma: Español
Tipo de documento: Artículo
Enfoque: Analítico, descriptivo
Resumen en inglés Popper argues in the Logic of Scientific Discovery (published in 1934 in German) against both an externalist and an inter nalist epistemic justification for observational statements; Popper then opts in t he LSD for a position that substitutes the justification of the basic statemen ts of science with their criti - cism; and he stops a regress of criticisms with som e conventional decisions. Later, in the Open Society (1945) he argues for a critical rationalism, one t hat requires some argumentatively unjustified and unjus tifiable presuppositions, i.e., it requires some dogmas. The late Popper (cir ca 1983), seems inclined towards a pancritical rationalism, a position that leads, however, to a logical paradox, which can only be evaded if some presuppos itions are to be accepted as not criticizable. Thus, the Popperian requires e ither some unjustifiable or some uncriticizable presuppositions. These dogmatic presuppositions should be believed passively and judgment about their trut h value should be sus - pended. This is the Popperian’s Pyrrhonian attitude
Disciplinas: Filosofía
Palabras clave: Filosofía de la ciencia,
Doctrinas y corrientes filosóficas,
Racionalismo crítico,
Racionalismo,
Popper, Karl,
Dogmatismo,
Justificación,
Epistemología,
Irracionalismo
Texto completo: Texto completo (Ver PDF)