The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament



Título del documento: The Winner Curse and Social Inefficiency: Double Whammy of R&D Tournament
Revista: Journal of technology management & innovation
Base de datos: CLASE
Número de sistema: 000407352
ISSN: 0718-2724
Autores: 1
2
Instituciones: 1University of Nottingham, Nottingham Centre for Research on Globalisation and Economic Policy, Nottingham, Nottinghamshire. Reino Unido
2National University of Kaohsiung, Department of Applied Economics, Kaohsiung. Taiwán
Año:
Periodo: Dic
Volumen: 6
Número: 4
Paginación: 73-79
País: Chile
Idioma: Inglés
Tipo de documento: Artículo
Enfoque: Aplicado
Resumen en inglés In a R&D tournament setting with free entry and knowledge spillover, we show that the society would suffer from ex- cessive entry and the patent holder would endure lower profits than non-patent holders because it bears the cost of commercializing and further technology development, while the other firms are beneficiaries of the spillover effects. This result is instructive to R&D and competition policy
Disciplinas: Economía
Palabras clave: Empresas,
Economías de escala,
Mercados,
Oligopolios,
Eficiencia
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