| Revista: | Ludus vitalis |
| Base de datos: | CLASE |
| Número de sistema: | 000445812 |
| ISSN: | 1133-5165 |
| Autores: | Melamed, Andrea F1 |
| Instituciones: | 1Universidad de Buenos Aires, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Buenos Aires. Argentina |
| Año: | 2016 |
| Volumen: | 23 |
| Número: | 45 |
| Paginación: | 135-153 |
| País: | México |
| Idioma: | Español |
| Tipo de documento: | Artículo |
| Enfoque: | Analítico |
| Resumen en inglés | The problem of how to characterize emotions is still open. Different approaches have been grouped into two major views: on the one hand, cognitive theory holds that emotions are essentially constituted by some kind of evaluative judgment; on the other, perceptual theory denies that an evaluation of that sort is necessary for an emotion to occur. In this paper I examine the proposal of evolutionary psychology, specially in the face of emotion problems. In particular, I consider the possibility that their original conception of emotions as superordinate programs, could solve the dispute between the perceptual view and those that defend that a cognitive component, usually an appraisal, is required for an emotion to occur |
| Disciplinas: | Filosofía, Psicología |
| Palabras clave: | Gnoseología, Historia y filosofía de la psicología, Cognición, Emociones, Percepción, Filosofía de la ciencia, Psicología cognitiva |
| Texto completo: | Texto completo (Ver PDF) |
