Quando leis não produzem os resultados esperados: financiamento eleitoral em perspectiva comparada



Título del documento: Quando leis não produzem os resultados esperados: financiamento eleitoral em perspectiva comparada
Revista: Dados
Base de datos: CLASE
Número de sistema: 000374082
ISSN: 0011-5258
Autores: 1
Instituciones: 1Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Programa de Pos-Graduacao em Ciencia Politica, Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul. Brasil
Año:
Volumen: 53
Número: 4
Paginación: 821-853
País: Brasil
Idioma: Portugués
Tipo de documento: Artículo
Enfoque: Analítico, descriptivo
Resumen en inglés Democracies have adopted different legislative models to regulate election finance: maximum limits to contributions, bans on donations by companies that provide public services or operate government concessions, and disclosure of private donations and public funds to cover campaign expenditures. The current study's underlying hypothesis is that there is no association between the legislation's rigor and improvement in indicators of institutional transparency. The study analyzes the extent to which different types of institutional formats like democracy, presidentialism, type of electoral slate, and size of voting districts, as well as economic development variables, can explain the failure of electoral legislation to produce transparency in election finance
Disciplinas: Ciencia política
Palabras clave: Activismo y participación política,
Financiamiento electoral,
Democracia,
Legislación electoral,
Transparencia
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