| Revista: | Revista mexicana de economía agrícola y de los recursos naturales |
| Base de datos: | CLASE |
| Número de sistema: | 000395756 |
| Autors: | Accinelli Gamba, Elvio1 Sánchez Carrera, Edgar J2 |
| Institucions: | 1Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí, Facultad de Economía, San Luis Potosí. México 2Universita degli Studi di Siena, Siena, Toscana. Italia |
| Any: | 2009 |
| Període: | Jul-Dic |
| Volum: | 2 |
| Número: | 3 |
| Paginació: | 127-144 |
| País: | México |
| Idioma: | Inglés |
| Tipo de documento: | Artículo |
| Enfoque: | Analítico, descriptivo |
| Resumen en inglés | This paper shows tractable and easy conditions for attaining the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in the Cournot oligopoly game with N firms where the cost functions are not necessarily quadratic and convex. The equilibrium is characterized in terms of best response (reaction) correspondence. The conditions assure that the reaction functions are a contraction mapping and they are not reduced to demand the well known conditions of concave games. However, the conditions are weaker as the number of firms increases |
| Disciplines | Economía |
| Paraules clau: | Econometría, Empresas, Equilibrio, Teoremas |
| Text complet: | Texto completo (Ver PDF) |
