| Revista: | Ludus vitalis |
| Base de datos: | CLASE |
| Número de sistema: | 000415906 |
| ISSN: | 1133-5165 |
| Autors: | Castellano, Federico1 |
| Institucions: | 1Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades, Córdoba. Argentina |
| Any: | 2014 |
| Volum: | 22 |
| Número: | 42 |
| Paginació: | 157-178 |
| País: | México |
| Idioma: | Español |
| Tipo de documento: | Artículo |
| Enfoque: | Analítico, crítico |
| Resumen en inglés | Recently, the cognitive sciences have been involv ed in a debate between Representationalists and anti-Representatio nalists as to the repre - sentational status of the Watt governor. Tim van Ge lder has argued that the Watt governor is a paradigmatic example of an intel ligent system, which is not in need of internal representations to carry out it s cognitive activity. In re - sponse, William Bechtel has argued that, given the ‘stand-in’ definition of representation, such artifact should be interpreted as representing. My aim in this paper is to give a negative answer to the question. To support this I will argue that it is essential for the representations to be normative , which means that they are only attributable to those who/which have the capacity to correct their behavior. Being so, the governor should not b e located within the set of representational systems, because it is not possibl e to find in its behaviors signs of this normative capacity |
| Disciplines | Filosofía |
| Paraules clau: | Filosofía de la ciencia, Gnoseología, Representaciones, Causalidad, Cognición, Representaciones, Dinamismo, Ciencia cognitiva, Normatividad |
| Text complet: | Texto completo (Ver PDF) |
