| Revista: | Caminhos da História (Montes Claros. Online) |
| Base de datos: | |
| Número de sistema: | 000556165 |
| ISSN: | 2317-0875 |
| Autors: | Malena, Jorge Eduardo1 |
| Institucions: | 1Universidad Católica Argentina, |
| Any: | 2016 |
| Volum: | 21 |
| Número: | 1 |
| Paginació: | 79-92 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Idioma: | Portugués |
| Resumen en inglés | The main reason for China"s engagement in the Vietnam War (VW) was deterrence. The leadership in Beijing sought to persuade the US not to escalate in the conflict, because the costs to Washington would be too high. This work attempts firstly to outline four main sources influencing Chinese strategy, secondly to present the events in 1965 that led the Chinese leadership to engage in the VW, and lastly to contrast those main sources with China"s decision to enter the War, in order to test the validity of such elements. |
| Resumen en español | The main reason for China"s engagement in the Vietnam War (VW) was deterrence. The leadership in Beijing sought to persuade the US not to escalate in the conflict, because the costs to Washington would be too high. This work attempts firstly to outline four main sources influencing Chinese strategy, secondly to present the events in 1965 that led the Chinese leadership to engage in the VW, and lastly to contrast those main sources with China"s decision to enter the War, in order to test the validity of such elements. |
| Resumen en español | The main reason for China"s engagement in the Vietnam War (VW) was deterrence. The leadership in Beijing sought to persuade the US not to escalate in the conflict, because the costs to Washington would be too high. This work attempts firstly to outline four main sources influencing Chinese strategy, secondly to present the events in 1965 that led the Chinese leadership to engage in the VW, and lastly to contrast those main sources with China"s decision to enter the War, in order to test the validity of such elements. |
| Resumen en portugués | The main reason for China"s engagement in the Vietnam War (VW) was deterrence. The leadership in Beijing sought to persuade the US not to escalate in the conflict, because the costs to Washington would be too high. This work attempts firstly to outline four main sources influencing Chinese strategy, secondly to present the events in 1965 that led the Chinese leadership to engage in the VW, and lastly to contrast those main sources with China"s decision to enter the War, in order to test the validity of such elements. |
| Paraules clau: | China, Strategy, Vietnam War, Deterrence |
| Keyword: | China, Strategy, Vietnam War, Deterrence |
| Text complet: | Texto completo (Ver PDF) |
