Monitoring and Managerial Discretion Effects on Agency Costs: Evidence from an Emerging Economy



Título del documento: Monitoring and Managerial Discretion Effects on Agency Costs: Evidence from an Emerging Economy
Revista: BAR - Brazilian Administration Review
Base de datos: CLASE
Número de sistema: 000507161
ISSN: 1807-7692
Autors: 1
1
1
2
Institucions: 1Universidad de Concepción, Los Angeles, Biobío. Chile
2Universidad de Concepción, Concepción, Bío-Bío. Chile
Any:
Volum: 18
Número: 1
País: Brasil
Idioma: Inglés
Tipo de documento: Artículo
Enfoque: Analítico, descriptivo
Resumen en inglés We analyzed the effect of managerial ownership, leverage, and managerial discretion on the agency costs of 14,719 Chilean companies. The results of the instrumental variables (IV) regressions indicate that managerial ownership and capital structure have a negative and non-linear effect on agency costs. Managerial ownership concentration is an effective means of internal control over agency costs, discarding the managerial entrenchment effect. The non-linear impact of debt suggests that for high leverage levels, agency costs would increase due to higher bankruptcy costs. Managerial discretion reduces agency costs; however, in firms with low growth opportunities, it increases them. These results have relevant implications for firms’ corporate policy and investors
Disciplines Administración y contaduría
Paraules clau: Administración de instituciones,
Costos,
Supervisión,
Oportunidades de crecimiento
Keyword: Management of institutions,
Agency costs,
Managerial discretion,
Monitoring,
Growth opportunities
Text complet: https://biblat.unam.mx/hevila/BARBrazilianadministrationreview/2021/vol18/no1/2.pdf Texto completo (Ver HTML) Texto completo (Ver PDF)