

TIEMPO DE GUERRA: FOUCAULT, HOBBS Y LA PROMESA DE LA PAZ*

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R E S U M E N

Este ensayo interpreta la idea hobbesiana del tiempo y de la constitución del sentido como “sentido decadente” o como imaginación, para argüir que la guerra —la guerra de todos contra todos— es una condición universal y existencial de y para la vida. El ensayo investiga la concepción de Hobbes del lenguaje, del miedo y de la anticipación para demostrar la incondicionalidad de la guerra y, además, argumenta que, en Hobbes, la paz es una modificación empírica de la guerra, para concluir —contra Foucault— que en Hobbes no hay una distinción entre la guerra y el “estado de guerra”, y que la “guerra” existencial debe entenderse como una forma del “cuidarse de sí” hobbesiano, que Foucault mismo dice que es “co-extensivo con la vida”. El ensayo pone en tela de juicio la interpretación foucaultiana —siguiendo a Séneca y a otros— de que la *parresia* resulta de la indiferencia o desapego por la vida, esto es, el resultado de vivir la vida como si uno ya estuviese muerto.

PALABRAS CLAVE: “cuidado de sí” - guerra - imaginación - sentido - tiempo - lenguaje - metáfora - miedo - promesa - parresía.

WARTIME: FOUCAULT, HOBBS AND THE PROMISE OF PEACE

* Artículo recibido el 10 de marzo de 2014 y aprobado el 20 de abril de 2014.

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This essay interprets Hobbes's understanding of time and the constitution of sense as "decaying sense," or imagination, in order to argue that war — the "war of all against all" — is a universal, existential condition of and for life. The essay explores Hobbes's understanding of language, fear and anticipation to demonstrate the inevitability of war and argues that, for Hobbes, peace is an empirical modification of war. The essay argues, against Foucault, that for Hobbes there is no distinction between war and the "state of war" and, furthermore, that existential "war" ought to be understood as Hobbes's conception of the "care of the self", which Foucault claims is "coextensive with life". The essay challenges Foucault's interpretation, following Seneca and others, that *parrhesia* follows from detachment from life, that is, from the practice of living one's life as if one were already dead.

KEYWORDS: "care of the self" - war - imagination - sense - time - language - metaphor - fear - promise - *parrhesia*.

WARTIME: FOUCAULT, HOBBS AND THE PROMISE OF PEACE

*«Je suis en guerre contre moi-même... mais en même temps je sais que
c'est la vie. Je ne trouverai la paix que dans le repos éternel».*
— Jacques Derrida, *Apprendre à vivre enfin*

About half way through *L'herméneutique du sujet*, Foucault claims to have demonstrated how, in the late Hellenist and early Christian period, the "care of the self" took "the form of a general and unconditional principle". He concludes, simply, " 'to care for the self' is a rule coextensive with life [*«Se soucier de soi» est une règle coextensive à la vie*]"¹. There is no moment in which a living being does not care for itself. Whether or not Foucault's notions of "life" and the "care of the self" extend only to living *human* beings, the claim that care of the self is coextensive with life means that it commences with the beginning of life and ends with death. Living beings must care for themselves because they do not bear within themselves the necessary conditions for sustaining life. Because living beings must feed themselves, they must be in touch with the world. The double-bind of the living being is that it is constitutively cut off from the conditions for sustaining its being (qua living) and, at the same time, it must attach itself to that which is outside, its circumstances or conditions, in order to survive.

1 FOUCAULT, Michel. *L'herméneutique du sujet*. Cours au Collège de France. 1980-1981 (Paris: Seuil/Gallimard, 2001), 237; and FOUCAULT, Michel. *The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France. 1981-1982*. Burcell, Graham (trans.) (London: Picador, 2005), 247.

The “care of the self” indicates the endless struggle for survival, in which everything the living being encounters either serves to sustain it or threatens to annihilate it.

Perhaps no philosopher more compellingly describes the violence inherent in the care of the self than Thomas Hobbes, who never refers specifically to the “care of the self,” but rather describes the struggle for existence as the war of all against all. This war transforms the life of the living being from beginning to end; from the so-called state of nature through the civil state. War is unrelievable for life. Yet, in an important reading of Hobbes, Foucault claims, “At bottom, the discourse of Hobbes, is a certain ‘no’ to war”². Rather than reading Hobbes as a theorist of what he calls, in *Surveiller et punir*, “perpetual battle”³, Foucault reads him as a philosopher of peace. This makes sense; after all, Hobbes’s conception of the “war of every man against every man”⁴, which characterizes the state of nature, appears to give way —through an act of reason— to the covenant for peace that institutes State sovereignty. But to read Hobbes this way requires two strategic maneuvers: first, that Foucault draw a line between “war” and the “state of war”; and, second, that he ignore Hobbes’s remarks about language and time. By ignoring what Hobbes says about language and time, Foucault can restrict Hobbes to political philosophy, rather than reading Hobbes’s understanding of “war” as the existential condition that makes politics necessary for survival. In other words, for Hobbes, “war” is another way to say, “care of the self”⁵ or life.

That doesn’t mean, however, that Hobbes doesn’t think it makes sense to strive for peace. The question is, what is peace and how does it come about? How does a passion for self-preservation become a passion for peace that necessarily jeopardizes our lives by granting another the power to kill or let live?

The answer is fear. We are afraid, because we are equal. In the state of nature human beings are equal in two ways. *First*, we share a universal and thus equal right of self-preservation, which gives to everyone a “Right to

2 FOUCAULT, Michel. *Il faut défendre la société*. Cours au Collège de France, 1976 (Paris: Seuil/Gallimard, 1997), 84. See also: FOUCAULT. “Society Must Be Defended”. *Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976* (London: Picador, 2003), 97.

3 FOUCAULT, Michel. *Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison* (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1975), 39.

4 HOBBS, Thomas. *Leviathan*. Richard Tuck (ed.) (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1991), 90.

5 For example, when Foucault offers a reinterpretation of the history of philosophy in order to show that the “care of the self” (qua spiritual exercise) never quite disappears from modern philosophy, he begins with Descartes and avoids Hobbes altogether. See: FOUCAULT, Michel. *L’herméneutique*, 180-183.

every thing; even to one another's body"⁶ in order to preserve his/her own life. Such equality results in universal insecurity: "as long as this natural Right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, (how strong or wise soever he may be,) of living out the time, which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live"⁷. *Second*, all human beings also share a "natural equality"⁸ for self-preservation: "Nature hath made men so equal in the faculties of body, and mind; as that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind than another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himself"⁹. Even if I were physically stronger than every other person, I would still be threatened by "secret machinations, or by confederacy with others." It follows from such freedom and equality "that where an Invader hath no more to fear, than another man's single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possess a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossess, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life, of liberty. And the Invader again is in the like danger of another..."¹⁰.

No one is safe. Men live, Hobbes tells us, in "continual fear, and danger of violent death"¹¹. For this reason, Hobbes points out, the best means of protection against others is "Anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: And this is no more than his own conservation requireth"¹². Because we fear the other, we arm ourselves:

It may seem strange to some man that has not well weighed these things; that Nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to invade, and destroy one another: and he may therefore, not trusting to this Inference, made from the Passions, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by Experience. Let him therefore consider with himself, when taking a journey, he arms himself, and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his doors; when even in his house he locks his

6 HOBBS, Thomas. *Op. Cit.*, 91.

7 *Ibid.*

8 HOBBS, Thomas. *Man and Citizen*. Bernard Gert (ed.) (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991), 113.

9 HOBBS, Thomas. *Leviathan*, 86-87; see also: HOBBS, Thomas. *Man and Citizen*, 114.

10 HOBBS, Thomas *Leviathan*, 87-88.

11 *Ibid.*, 89.

12 *Ibid.*, 87-88.

chests; and this when he knows there be Lawes, and public Officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall bee done him; what opinion he has of his fellow subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow Citizens, when he locks his doors; and of his children, and servants, when he locks his chests. Does he not there as much accuse man's nature in it¹³.

Hobbes here does not describe the so-called state of nature, but, rather, the civil state, the state in which "there be Lawes, and public Officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall bee done him"¹⁴. Even in this state, we arm ourselves against others, even against those of our own house. "Every other — including those we include in our 'we' — is for us a figure of death," explains Werner Hamacher¹⁵. Fear leads us to anticipate what comes enabling us to protect ourselves against it thereby alleviating our fear; but, at the same time, anticipating what comes produces fear. Anticipation, without which there would be no fear, allows us to conceive the threat to our lives, thus produces our fear, and instances the chance for survival.

According to Hobbes, the "general rule of Reason, *That every man, ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of Warre*"¹⁶, is conditioned by a passion for peace that stems from fear: "The Passions that incline men to Peace, are Feare of Death; Desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them"¹⁷. The inclination to peace thus arises from the same passion that leads men to take up arms against one another. The same fear that leads men to protect themselves in accordance with the first law of nature is the fear that inclines them to follow the general rule of reason. The State arises out of fear. Consequently, Leo Strauss suggested, "Not the rational and therefore always uncertain knowledge that death is the greatest and supreme evil, but the fear of death, i.e. the emotional and inevitable, and therefore necessary and certain, aversion from death is the origin of law and the State"¹⁸. In response to the objection that men do not "grow into civil societies out of fear," for "if they had been afraid, they would not have endured each other's looks"¹⁹, Hobbes clarified his understanding of fear. "I comprehend in this word *fear, a certain foresight of future evil*; neither do I conceive flight

13 *Ibid.*, 89.

14 *Ibid.*

15 See HAMACHER, Werner. "Wild Promises: On the Language 'Leviathan'". CR: *The New Centennial Review* 4.3 (2004), 216.

16 HOBBS, Thomas, *Op. Cit.*, 92.

17 *Ibid.*, 90.

18 See STRAUSS, Leo. *The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its Basis and Genesis*, Sinclair, Elsa M. (trans.) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), 17.

19 HOBBS, Thomas. *Man and Citizen*, 113n.

the sole property of fear, but to distrust, suspect, take heed, provide so that they may not fear, is also incident to the fearful"²⁰. Fear is anticipation. And the fearful do more than flee: they are distrustful, suspicious, and heedful; they do what they must to "master" those around them "by force or wiles, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him"²¹. It is clear, however, that in Hobbes one never arrives at a moment of peace, that is, at the moment when he or she no longer fears what comes. This is the case even after the civil state has been achieved. Anticipation, hence fear, is perpetual: "For being assured that there be causes of all things that have arrived hitherto, or shall arrive hereafter; it is impossible for a man, who continually endeavoureth to secure himself against the evil he fears, and procure the good he desireth, not to be in a perpetual solicitude of the time to come"²². Put simply, we anticipate because we fear, and we fear because we anticipate. Indeed, Hobbes writes: "So that man, which looks too far before him, in the care of future time, hath his heart all the day long, gnawed on by fear of death, poverty, or other calamity; and has no repose, nor pause of his anxiety, but in sleep"²³.

Continual fear of violent death results in war between us. Hobbes writes:

For WARRE, consisteth not in Battel only, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of *Time*, is to be considered in the nature of Warre; as it is in the nature of Weather. For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a shower or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many days together: So the nature of War, consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary²⁴.

In *De Cive* Hobbes is more concise: "For what is WAR, but that same time in which the will of contesting by force is fully declared, either by words or deeds?"²⁵ "The time remaining", Hobbes explains, "is termed PEACE"²⁶. It is important to stress Hobbes' understanding of war, and in particular his insistence on its temporality, because it plays an important role in Foucault's claim that in Hobbes there is no war, but rather — making a distinction that makes little sense in Hobbes — only the state of war.

²⁰ *Ibidem.*, emphasis added.

²¹ HOBBS, Thomas. *Leviathan*, 87-88.

²² *Ibidem.*, 76.

²³ *Ibidem.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 88-89.

²⁵ HOBBS, Thomas. *Man and Citizen*, 118.

²⁶ *Ibidem.*

War is the time in which we are disposed to belligerence, whether we are currently in battle or not; it is the time during which our preparedness to defend ourselves is made manifest by signs and declarations of war. Foucault's argument is that where the differences between us are small, insignificant or insufficient, where there are no "marked, visible or great natural differences" between us, in short, where there is equality, there is war. Foucault writes:

Even a man who is a little weaker than other men, than the other man, is sufficiently similar to the strongest man to realize that he is strong enough not to have to surrender. So the weak man never gives up. As for the strong man, he is never strong enough not to be worried and, therefore, not to be constantly on his guard. The absence of natural differences therefore creates uncertainties, risks, hazards, and, therefore, the will to fight on both sides; it is the aleatory element in the primal relationship of force that creates the state of war [état de guerre]²⁷.

Consequently, Foucault claims, "War is the immediate effect of non-differences"²⁸. Yet, because the weaker is never willing to give up and the stronger is never strong enough not to feel threatened, there is, in fact, no war. Foucault suggests that the Hobbesian war of all against all "is not one between weapons or fists, or between savage forces that have been unleashed"²⁹. "There are no battles in Hobbes's primitive war, there is no blood and there are no corpses"³⁰. Rather, there is display, artifice, negotiation: "There are representations [*représentations*], manifestations, signs, emphatic expressions, ruses [*rusées*], and deceitful expressions [*mensongères*]; there are traps, intentions disguised as their opposite, and worries disguised as certainties"³¹. Foucault here invokes the temporal dimension of the state of war.

We are in a theater of exchanged representations [*représentations échangées*], in a relationship of fear which is a temporally indefinite relation [*qui est un rapport temporellement indéfinie*]; we are not really involved in a war. Which means, ultimately, that the state of bestial savagery, in which living individuals devour one another can in no way be the primary characteristic of Hobbes's state of war. What does characterize the state of war is a sort of unending diplomacy [*diplomatie infinie*] between

27 FOUCAULT, Michel. *Il faut*, 78-79; FOUCAULT, Michel. *Society*, 91.

28 *Ibid.*, 78; *ibid.*, 90.

29 *Ibid.*, 79; *ibid.*, 92.

30 *Ibidem*; *ibidem*.

31 *Ibidem*; *ibidem*.

rivals who are naturally equal. We are not at war; we are in what Hobbes specifically calls a state of war³².

War is, as Hobbes tells us, “a tract of time.” Precisely because war is temporal, however, and this is Hobbes’s point, it is possible to be at war or in a state of war, but not be in battle. War is not only defined by battle and bloodshed. Consequently, at every instance in which we are at war or in a state of war, there may not be what Foucault takes as the condition of war, namely, the “state of bestial savagery in which living individuals devour one another.” For Hobbes, the disposition — demonstrated by either words or deeds — to belligerence defines war as the state of war. It is a state of war because we cannot predict when or if it will end.

Foucault thus decides that we are not *at* war but merely in a *state* of war, which suggests that Foucault knows what war is and where and when to find it³³. “We can therefore see how and why this state — and it is not a battle or a direct clash of forces,” Foucault insists, “but a certain state of the play of representations against one another — is not a stage that man will abandon forever once the State is born; it is in fact a sort of permanent backdrop which cannot not function, with its elaborate ruses [*ruses*] and its complex calculations [*ses calculs mêlés*], once there is nothing to provide security, to establish differences, and finally to give the strength to one side and not the other”. So, Foucault concludes in 1976, “there is no war at the beginning, for Hobbes”³⁴.

Three years earlier Foucault suggested otherwise: “If there is indeed war of all against all, it is from the beginning because men are equal in the objects and the goals they target, because they are equivalent in the means that they have for procuring that which they seek”³⁵. In other words, in 1973, equality results in war and not just a state of war. It does so, Foucault observes, because everyone is substitutable for another: “They are in some way substitutable each for the other, and it is for this reason that they seek precisely to substitute one for the other and that, when the one desires something, the other can always substitute himself for the first, can always want to take his place and appropriate that which the first desires”³⁶. Although Foucault acknowledges the war of all against all in 1973, he nevertheless stresses that it ought not to be assimilated to civil

32 *Ibid.*, 79-80; *ibid.*, 92.

33 On the possibility that the concept of war is not so easily determined, see GASTON, Sean. “(Not) Meeting Without Name”. *Symploke*. 16.1-2 (2008): 107-125, especially 111.

34 FOUCAULT, Michel. *Il faut*, 80; FOUCAULT, Michel. *Society*, 93.

35 FOUCAULT, Michel. *La société punitive. Cours au Collège de France. 1972-1973* (Paris: Seuil/Gallimard, 2013), 27. Translations of *La société punitive* are my own.

36 *Ibid.*, 27-28. It is one of French’s felicities that substitution literally kills (“substituer”).

war³⁷. Foucault gives two reasons for not assimilating the two wars. *First*, the war of all against all takes place between individuals and is natural: "It is initially a natural, universal dimension of relations between individuals as individuals. It is the individual insofar as he is, within his relation with others, the bearer of the permanent possibility of the war of all against all"³⁸. Foucault quotes Hobbes, who claims simply that the war of all against all is "the necessary consequence of the natural passions of men"³⁹. Further, that the war of all against all refers to a war of individuals against individuals does not mean that there could not have been families, groups, even larger alliances, but such alliances do not mitigate a fundamental isolation: "Hobbes says that we have families in vain, that the family does not prevent that on the inside of its circle the war of all against all continues to play"⁴⁰. So long as every member of the group is substitutable by another, so long as the group—however large—is one of equals, the group remains constituted of individuals and the war of all against all continues. *Second*, unlike the war of all against all, civil war takes place within the compass of power (*pouvoir*) or sovereignty: civil war "does not take place outside of a relation of power. Civil war takes place in the theater of power. There is no civil war except within the element of constituted political power; it takes place in order to preserve or to conquer power, in order to confiscate it or transform it. It is not that which ignores or purely and simply destroys power, rather it always supports itself on the elements of power"⁴¹. For Foucault, then, the war of all against all is characterized by the lack of power (*pouvoir*) or sovereignty. This lack creates room for infinite substitutability and, therefore, uncertainty and instability.

On Foucault's account, the war of all against all — the infinite possibility of substitution — ends only once one person accrues a surplus of power (*puissance*) such that no other can take his or her place. The war of all against all ends with the end of substitution and, therefore, the end of equality.

There is only one way to quiet this distrust and stop this rivalry, which is that one of the perpetual combatants overrides the others through something like an addition of power [*un surcroît de puissance*]; that is, that he appropriates to himself not only an object of pleasure, but, moreover, an instrument for its conquest; as a consequence, he augments his own power [*puissance*] in relation to others and leaves the state of schematic equality that is given at the start to all men; addition of power

37 *Ibid.*, 26-27.

38 *Ibid.*, 27.

39 *Ibid.*, 28.

40 *Ibid.*, 29.

41 *Ibid.*, 30.

[*surcroît de puissance*] from which he expects precisely this effect, that we no longer seek to substitute for him and that he is able to enjoy peacefully [*tranquillement*] that which he has, that is, that we respect him⁴².

A surplus of power (*puissance*) results in the cessation of substitution and the production of inequality and respect. We respect the one whose place we cannot take, the one to whom we are not equal, the one who, among us, is irreplaceable, without substitute, the one whom we fear so much that we lack the power to kill.

For Foucault, the increase and addition of power and the inequality that arises therefrom, instances the human being's entrance into the system of signs, thus, into language, and, as well, marks the transition to sovereignty and the civil state. Language results from inequality, from the increase and accumulation of power: "The increase of power makes men enter into the system of signs, of marks, and the addition of power is essentially destined to install within the relations between men the visible mark of the power of one of them"⁴³. Infinite substitutability ends, then, with the *transfer* of power. One movement (transference of power) replaces another (substitution of bodies) in order to put an end to movement through the structure of sovereignty, and, therefore, put an end to the war of all against all. "It is only the civil order, that is, the appearance of a sovereign that will make cease the war of all against all. This process, by which the powers [*les pouvoirs*] of all individuals were transferred to a single individual or to an assembly and all the wills reduced to a single one, was necessary. The war of all against all ceases only from the moment that the sovereign is effectively constituted by this transfer of power [*pouvoir*]"⁴⁴. It is worth noting that what Foucault read, in 1973, as a war of all against all that could only cease through entry into the system of signs and marks of power, in 1976 he reads as a state of war in which signs — representations — operate in order to maintain a certain *détente* amongst equals in order to avoid bloodshed. Of interest is less the difference between 1973 and 1976, however, than what remains the same in both cases, namely, Foucault's indifference to Hobbes's understanding of language and the temporal constitution of sense. By not paying attention to language and time, Foucault effectively ignores Hobbes's conception of the specific threat presented by the technology or prosthetic that makes human community possible. In doing so, as it turns out, he also fails to locate in Hobbes the impossibility of self-mastery and *parrhesia* he promotes as the "care of the self" in his last seminars.

42 *Ibid.*, 28.

43 *Ibidem*.

44 FOUCAULT, Michel. *La société*, 30.

Leviathan begins by signaling the ground for all thought and experience: "Concerning the Thoughts of man," Hobbes writes, "I will consider them first *singly*, and afterwards in *Trayne*, or dependence upon one another. *Singly*, they are every one a *Representation* or *Apparence*, of some quality, or other Accident of a body without us; which is commonly called an *Object*"⁴⁵. Thought is the representation or appearance of an object foreign to me, which means, on Hobbes's account, "thought" includes — and is grounded upon — sense perception: "The Original of them all, is that which we call SENSE; (For there is no conception in a mans mind, which hath not at first totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of Sense). The rest are derived from that original"⁴⁶. Importantly, Hobbes ties sense perception to the present. Derivative sense or what Hobbes calls *decaying sense* is the imagination:

For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, we still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it that which the Latins call *Imagination*, from the image made in seeing; and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks call it *fancy*; which signifies *apparence*, and is as proper to one sense, as to another. IMAGINATION therefore is nothing but *decaying sense*; and is found in men, and many other living Creatures, as well sleeping, as waking⁴⁷.

At stake in the decay of sense, and thus in the imagination, is temporal determination: the imagination is always of what is no longer: "the Imagination of the past is obscured, and made weak; as the voice of a man is in the noise of the day. From whence it followeth, that the longer the time is, after the sight, or Sense of any object, the weaker is the Imagination"⁴⁸. Indeed, as Hobbes says, "*Imagination* and *Memory*... are but one thing"⁴⁹.

His insistence on the temporal difference between sense and imagination notwithstanding, Hobbes acknowledges that sense is already cut off from the present and is, therefore, imagination. "Yet still the object is one thing, the image or fancy are another. So that Sense in all cases, is nothing else but original fancy"⁵⁰. Hobbes even corrects himself when he writes, "This *decaying sense*, when we would express the thing itself, (I mean *fancy* itself), we call *Imagination*"⁵¹. In other words, there is no opposition between the ostensibly self-present sense of what is and the imagination of

45 HOBBS, Thomas. *Leviathan*, 13.

46 *Ibidem*.

47 *Ibid.*, 15.

48 *Ibid.*, 16.

49 *Ibidem*.

50 *Ibid.*, 14.

51 *Ibid.*, 16.

what is no longer, because, in fact, there is only imagination, what Hobbes calls “original fancy” (sense) and “decaying sense” (imagination). In brief, “this *seeming*, or *fancy*, is that which men call *Sense*”⁵².

The determination of sense as imagination, hence as always already in decay, troubles Hobbes’s commitment to the present.

The *Present* only has a being in Nature; things *Past* have a being in the Memory only, but things *to come* have no being at all; the *Future* being but a fiction of the mind, applying the sequels of actions Past, to the actions that are Present; which with most certainty is done by him that has most Experience; *but not with certainty enough* [emphasis added—DEJ]. And though it be called Prudence, when the Event answereth our Expectation; yet in its own nature, it is but Presumption⁵³.

Hobbes’s account of time — in which the present has being in nature — accords neither with Aristotle’s classic definition of it as divided between the no longer, the not yet, and of which no part is; nor with his own rendering of sense as “original fancy” and therefore as decaying. Insofar as Hobbes recognizes that “Whatsoever we imagine is Finite”⁵⁴, that is, temporal, thus decaying, he must also conclude that nature, which is no less temporal, is divided in itself. If this is so, then the present can have being in nature only if “being” is not understood as undivided self-presence, but, rather, as simulacrum, as an effect of the imagination. And this would mean that life is constitutively in decay: “For there is no such thing as perpetual Tranquillity of mind, while we live here; because Life itself is but Motion, and can never be without Desire, nor without Fear, no more than without Sense”⁵⁵.

Life is divided between the past and the future; it is constituted in the imagination of what is no longer (memory) and what is not yet (anticipation/fear). The movement of life is incessant. Hobbes puts it succinctly: “to have no Desire, is to be Dead”⁵⁶. The importance of this for Hobbes’s political philosophy cannot be overstated. The living being — not just the living human being — is determined by a finitude that makes desire and fear constitutive and unrelievable. This has two consequences for life. First,

52 *Ibid.*, 14.

53 *Ibid.*, 22. Marcelo Boeri argues that beyond “all the disparities his thought in this respect suffers, Hobbes maintains the thesis that the experience of the past teaches men in the present to act wisely to achieve peace”; see BOERI, Marcelo. “From the *History of the Peloponnesian War* to *Leviathan*: Hobbes and the Knowledge and Wisdom for Peace”. *CR: The New Centennial Review* 13.1 (2013), 72.

54 *Ibid.*, 23.

55 *Ibid.*, 46.

56 *Ibid.*, 54.

because time is incessant decay, Aristotle's claim that no temporal being can "continuously persist in its identity"⁵⁷ holds for Hobbes as well. But if time is finite, decay; and if life is motion, such that nothing continuously persists in its identity; then it must also be the case that there is no time for peace. Because nothing rests in itself, because nothing remains present to itself, all time —all life— is marked by strife, by division. All time is wartime. Peace is an empirical modification of war⁵⁸. Second, because life is desire, it is impossible not to say "yes" to life. There is no moment in a living being's existence in which that being does not desire and, therefore, desire to survive. The "yes" to life is universal⁵⁹.

The constitution of time impinges upon Hobbes's understanding of language or of speech, which, he claims, is "the most noble and profitable invention of all other"⁶⁰, for without it, men would be unable to register their thoughts, make use of memory, or make conversation. There would be "neither Common-wealth, nor Society, nor Contract, nor Peace"⁶¹. Hobbes writes: "The general use of Speech, is to transfer our Mental Discourse into Verbal; or the Trayne of our Thoughts, into a Trayne of Words"⁶². Words are signs, according to Hobbes, by which thoughts —hence our desires and fears— are conveyed. As the "invention" that makes possible the train of words that conveys the train of thoughts, speech is the prosthetic or technical device that makes commonwealth —and thus State sovereignty and all that it promises— possible. But it is also dangerous, threatening, for several reasons:

First, when men register their thoughts wrong, by the inconstancy of the signification of their words; by which they register for their conceptions, that which they never conceived; and so deceive themselves. Secondly, when they use words metaphorically; that is, in other sense than that they are ordained for; and thereby

57 ARISTOTLE, *Physics*. In: *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*. Barnes, Jonathan (ed.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 218a/370.

58 See: PATOCKA, Jan. *Essais hérétiques sur la philosophie de l'histoire*. Abrams, Erika (trans.) (Lagrasse: Éditions Verdier, 1990), 57-92 and 189-216. For an incisive reading of Patocka and the question of war, see: CRÉPON, Marc. *Vivre avec: La pensée de la mort et le mémoire des guerres* (Paris: Hermann Éditeurs, 2008), 91-112.

59 Foucault captures the importance of the constitutive desire for life in what he calls the "radical will to live" (FOUCAULT, Michel. *Il faut*, 83; FOUCAULT, Michel. *Society*, 96). On the universality and unconditionality of the desire for survival or "chronolibido", see: HÄGGLUND, Martin. *Dying for Time: Proust, Woolf, Nabokov* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 1-19, and *passim*. On hunger, life, and the suspension of the law in Hobbes, see: GARRIDO, Juan Manuel. *On Time, Being, and Hunger: Challenging the Traditional Way of Thinking Life* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2011), 82-84.

60 HOBBS, Thomas. *Op. Cit.*, 24.

61 *Ibid.*

62 *Ibid.*, 25.

deceive others. Thirdly, when by words they declare that to be their will, which is not. Fourthly, when they use them to grieve one another: for seeing nature hath armed living creatures, some with teeth, some with horns, and some with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an abuse of Speech, to grieve him with the tongue⁶³.

Words are arms.

The first item in Hobbes's list is the most important, in that while the other three are matters of our intentional use of words (to deceive, metaphorically, or as weapons to grieve the other), the first one concerns the possibility of intention itself. Words do not merely follow from our thoughts and thus convey them to others; rather, they constitute our thoughts by "registering" them in the first place. Consequently, the inconstancy of words⁶⁴ makes it possible for us to conceive what we have never conceived and thus to deceive ourselves in our own thought. No doubt Hobbes means to say that because we must fit our thoughts to words, in order to register them, and because words are inconstant in their meanings, our thoughts are liable to say both more and less than we intended. That is, we think both more and less than we think, thus, in thinking something we inevitably deceive ourselves in our own thought by thinking both more and less. This problem, however, is irreducible. Thus, as a rule, I can never simply say what I think (I say). My thought always deceives me. My thought always exceeds my intentions because the words I need to intend something, to mean to say something, make it impossible not to say something other than what I intend. This is the double bind of thought. In order to register *my* thought, I must use words; but using words makes it impossible to register *my* thought. Consequently, the condition of possibility for registering my thought is the impossibility of doing so. *My* thought deceives me because it comes to me from the other, from another. Between myself and my thought there is always difference, deferral; there is delay, thus a certain decadence or decay. Moreover, and this follows from Hobbes's understanding of whatever approaches me, because my thought is foreign to me, I must be on guard against it. I must arm myself against my thought, which explains why Hobbes attempts to restrict the words necessary for the constitution — the registration — of thought in the first place: "The Light of humane minds is Perspicuous Words, but by exact definitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity... And on the contrary, Metaphors, and senseless and ambiguous words, are like *ignes fatui*; and reasoning upon them, is

63 *Ibid.*, 25-26.

64 Hobbes: "the significations of almost all words, are either in themselves, or in the metaphorical use of them, ambiguous; and may be drawn in argument, to make many senses". (*Ibid.*, 194).

wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention, and sedition, or contempt"⁶⁵. Metaphors lead us astray. They betray our intentions even as they constitute them. They are seditious. They open onto civil war. Therefore, metaphor must be excluded: "But for Metaphors, they are in this case utterly excluded. For seeing them openly profess deceit; to admit them into Counsellor Reasoning, were manifest folly"⁶⁶.

Yet, even if metaphors could be excluded, metaphoricity — the logic or structure of "ference" (reference, transference, inference, etc.) — can not be, first, because the function of words in general is to transfer mental discourse into spoken; and, second, because without such transference the registration — thus constitution — of thought could not take place. Metaphoricity is transference. In other words, words are, from the start, *mobile*, hence *decaying*. Decay — which names the motion of life — is inscribed in the constitution of signs in general. According to Hobbes, "A *Signe*, is the Event Antecedent, of the Consequent; and contrarily, the Consequent of the Antecedent, when the like Consequences have been observed, before: And the oftener they have been observed, the less uncertain the *Signe*. And therefore he that has the most experience in any kind of business, has most *Signes*, whereby to guess at the Future time"⁶⁷. So, for Hobbes, prudence can be either "a *Praesumption* of the *Future*, contracted from the *Experience* of time *Past*"; or:

a *Praesumption* of things *Past* taken from other things (not future but) past also. For he that hath seen by what courses and degrees, a flourishing State hath first come to civil war, and then to ruin; upon the sight of the ruins of any other State, will guess, the like war, and the like courses have been there also. But this conjecture, has the same uncertainty almost with the conjecture of the Future; both being grounded only upon Experience⁶⁸.

We have already seen that in Hobbes, experience instances a decaying sense or the imagination of what has never been in itself or present. Insofar as signs follow from experience, they are uncertain because they are never anything other than indices of referral, of correspondence. The correspondence between past and past, no less than that between past and future, is never guaranteed. Signs can always go astray, mislead, and corrupt. In short, because of "the difficulty of observing all circumstances," prudence or one's judgment can "be very fallacious"⁶⁹.

65 *Ibid.*, 66.

66 *Ibid.*, 52.

67 *Ibid.*, 22-23.

68 *Ibid.*, 23.

69 *Ibid.*, 22.

Hobbes's understanding of time and language poses problems for the transference of rights that establishes the civil state and, with it, the sovereignty that over-awes and protects us. The conveyance of my rights, Hobbes tells us, cannot be unilateral. It requires not only that I —by some *sign or token*— convey the relinquishment of my right to resist, but also the acceptance by the other of that sign. Because conveyance is composed of a two-part temporally determined structure, a sign must mediate it is before and after. Transference, therefore, must always be *signed* and *countersigned*. "If either be wanting," Hobbes argues, "the right remains. For if I would have given what was mine to one who refused to accept it, I have not therefore either simply renounced my right, or conveyed it to any man"⁷⁰. Because transference can only take place in time, Hobbes seeks to limit the deleterious effects of temporal delay; that is, he seeks to secure the promise against its constitutive decay. He does so by doubling down, by adding to the promise another sign in the hope of mitigating temporal decay:

"although words alone are not sufficient tokens to declare the will; if yet to words relating to the future there shall some other signs be added, they may become as valid as if they had been spoken of the present. If therefore, as by reason of those other signs, it appear that he that speaks of the future, intends those words should be effectual toward the perfect transferring of his right, they ought to be valid. For the conveyance of right depends not on words, but... on the declaration of the will"⁷¹.

It is hard to credit Hobbes's wager that more signs can do what words alone cannot, as if signs did not refer or correspond and thus run the same risk as words, as if a sign were not always already sent off to the future. The future is inscribed in all signs, for a sign is not a sign if it operates only in the presence of the one who determines it. Signs are needed only because —as Hobbes's explanations of sense as decaying and of the necessary registration of thought make clear— because we are, in fact, never present to ourselves such that our will would be immediately present or given to us. On the contrary, our will can only ever be declared to us belatedly. Our will, which can only be known insofar as it is registered, arrives late. In other words, we are only ever given a sign of our will and because signs are uncertain, we can never be sure that we know our will.

There is no way around this dilemma. Temporal delay makes signs necessary. Yet, because signs are always signs of time, they necessarily indicate decaying sense, hence corruptibility. Because signs always point

⁷⁰ HOBBS, Thomas. *Man and Citizen*, 124.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 125.

toward an uncertain future, it is fundamentally impossible to know our will. It is important, however, that this impossibility is not privative; it is, rather, the condition for intending — and thus promising — to do anything, including transferring our rights. Without signs, we could never lay down our arms. Yet because signs are uncertain, we can never be sure that in laying down our arms, in relinquishing and transferring our rights, in making the signs of doing so, here and now, we are not in fact picking them up, rearming ourselves. It is always possible that surrendering is attacking. The promise of peace is the declaration of war.

In sum, the promise (covenant or contract) does not alleviate our fear. On the contrary, because the promise always exposes us to an uncertain future, it ineluctably results in our anticipating the worst.

For he that first performs, by reason of the wicked disposition of the greatest part of men studying their own advantage either by right or wrong, exposeth himself to the perverse will of him with whom he hath contracted. For it suits not with reason, that any man should perform first, if it be not likely that the other will make good his promise after; which, whether it be probably or not, he that doubts it must be judge of⁷².

Despite arguing that the institution of the civil state relieves us of the fear that others will not keep their promises, Hobbes concludes, “faith only is the bond of contracts”⁷³. One can only have faith in that which is not guaranteed.

Because the contract cannot be guaranteed, Hobbes asserts that “Another of the laws of nature is to *perform contracts, or to keep trust*,” because “to keep faith, is a thing necessary for the obtaining of peace”⁷⁴. Not to keep faith engages us in what the scholastics called an absurdity, because it violates the principle of non-contradiction. “He therefore who contracts with one with whom he thinks he is not bound to keep faith, he doth at once think a contract to be a thing done in vain, and not in vain; which is absurd... For by contracting for some future action, he wills it done; by not doing it, he wills it not done: which is to will a thing done and not done at the same time, which is a contradiction”⁷⁵. The principle of non-contradiction holds only if the will is indivisible, resting peacefully in itself, and thus safe from the ravages or decay of time. The problem, of course, is that were the will in itself or at peace, that is, were there no difference or delay between what we

⁷² *Ibid.*, 127.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 130.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 136.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 137.

thought and what we did, there would, in fact, be no need for the contract, which is only necessary because people cannot be trusted to do what they say. Indeed, were the will secure from time, there would be no fear, because there would be no anticipation; likewise, there would not only be no need for, but also no possibility of contracts, since nothing would be anticipated and nothing would be desired. One could not anticipate future needs or desires in order to will to fulfill them. There would be no fear, to be sure, because there would be no life, nothing to protect or defend, nothing for which to care. Consequently, Hobbes's assertion that "Either therefore we must hold trust with all men, or else not bargain with them; that is, either there must be a declared war, or a sure and faithful peace"⁷⁶, makes little sense. It is because we can only ever trust other men, that we will never have a "sure and faithful peace"; it is because we can only trust men that we will have always already declared war on them. Promising peace declares war. However well intentioned – and as the condition of intentionality – the one who signs the peace treaty ineluctably counterfeits and forfeits. We cannot not sign in the name of the other and testify to a will that we cannot know. In giving our word we take it back⁷⁷. Our bond broken, a declared peace is a symbol of war.

Foucault read none of this in Hobbes. Whereas *La société punitive* distinguishes the war of all against all from civil war in order to show that civil war opens onto the punitive society, "*Society Must Be Defended*" interprets the war of all against all as a bloodless *state* of war that anticipates the inauguration of war – bloody war – as the technique for analyzing social relations within the State, thereby opening onto the regime of biopower and biopolitics. The modern State will be constituted in and sustained through race war and the discourse of racial purification, which may or may not have reached its apotheosis in Nazi Germany. For Foucault, Hobbes's theorization of absolute sovereignty signals the crisis of sovereignty and marks the historical limit of the (purely) sovereign State and the first step towards the transition from the sovereign right to kill or let live to the biopolitical investment in making live and letting die. Foucault locates Hobbes just before the seeming end of absolute sovereignty, just before the end of the promise of peace, that is, perhaps, just before the end

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 136.

⁷⁷ Perhaps this is why Hobbes ultimately argues that we fulfill our contracts out of fear. He writes: "There must be some coercive Power, to compel men equally to the performance of their Covenants, by the terror of some punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their Covenant; and to make good that Propriety, which by mutual Contract men acquire, in recompense of the universal Right they abandon: and such power there is none before the erection of a Common-wealth" (HOBBS, Thomas. *Leviathan*, 100-101). On the one hand, fear makes the promise necessary; on the other hand, the promise promises fear. Or, as Derrida puts it, "La souveraineté fait peur, et la peur fait le souverain"; DERRIDA, Jacques. *Séminaire la bête et le souverain. Volume I (2001-2002)* (Paris: Éditions Galilée, 2008), 68-69.

of *either* a declared war *or* a secure and faithful peace. The *either/or* is only possible if the will is indivisible, hence, sovereign. The logic of Hobbes's text makes clear that sovereignty will never have been indivisible or absolute; sovereignty, rather, is always only promised, both the chance for and the threat to self-preservation. Sovereignty, in short, is possible on account – credit – of the *decay* that corrupts and institutes whatever happens.

At least until 1981-1982, thus, on the other side of what Deleuze suggested was “a sort of intellectual crisis”⁷⁸, Foucault seems to have understood the necessity of a gap or delay in the constitution of subjectivity. In *Les mots et les choses* (1966), for instance, Foucault remarks that the signature of all things inscribes the delay (*décalage*) necessary for the production of identity and difference insofar as – as the singular mark of what appears, of what is – it traces the movement and interrelation of the four modes of resemblance that organized the production of knowledge up to the end of the 16th century⁷⁹. This delay makes impossible any pure presentation even as it makes possible representation and, with it, identity, difference, knowledge, as well as the invention of “man”. The question is whether the heralded “end of man” also results in the end of constitutive delay and of the “as if” of representation, thus inaugurating the possibility of pure presentation and the “as such.” In other words, if, as Foucault claims at the end of *Les mots et les choses*, “man composed his own figure in the interstices of a language in fragments”⁸⁰, does the “end of man” result in the possibility of the absolution of the difference between enunciation and conduct, thus, in the unity of language and man, in short, of presence-to-self?⁸¹ Foucault leaves these questions suspended “there where they are posed knowing only that the possibility of their being posed opens undoubtedly onto a future thought”⁸².

The problem of representation and the limits it imposed on the possibility of “thinking otherwise,” haunted him to the end. In May 1984, for example,

78 DELEUZE, Gilles. “Foucault et les prisons”. In: *Deux régimes des fous: Textes et entretiens 1975-1995*. Lapoujade, David (ed.) (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 2003), 261-262.

79 See: FOUCAULT, Michel. *Les mots et les choses* (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1966), 44.

80 *Ibid.*, 397 [my translation].

81 Eric Paras claims that Foucault ultimately realized that “only the notion of strong subjectivity proved *warm* enough to accommodate an overwhelming passion for life and an inextinguishable belief in the primacy of human liberty” (*Foucault 2.0: Beyond Power and Knowledge* [New York: Other Press, 2006], 158). Following Paras, Kalliopi Nikolopoulou argues that for Foucault the return of the subject in *parrhesia* amounts to an insistence on the presence-to-self of the *parrhesiast*; see: Nikolopoulou. *Tragically Speaking: On the Use and Abuse of Theory for Life* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2013), 93-118. For another account of the shift in Foucault's work, see: Lemke. “Foucault's Hypothesis: From the Critique of the Juridico-Discursive Concept of Power to an Analytics of Government”. *Parrhesia: A Journal of Critical Philosophy* 9 (2010): 37-38.

82 FOUCAULT, Michel. *Les mots et les choses*, 397-398.

he distinguished his philosophical practice from deconstruction according to the problem of representation: "It is clear how far one is from an analysis in terms of deconstruction (any confusion between these two methods would be unwise...). The work of philosophical and historical reflection is put back into the field of the work of thought only on condition that one clearly grasps problematization not as an arrangement of representations [*un ajustement des représentations*], but as a work of thought"⁸³. It is hard to know what Foucault means by an "arrangement of representations," but it is clear that, for him, what is at stake is not representation, but freedom. The work of thought, insofar as it is constituted as *problématisation*, is the work of freedom: "Thought is not what inhabits a certain conduct and gives it its meaning; rather, it is what allows one to step back from this way of acting or reacting, to present it to oneself as an object of thought and to question it as to its meaning, its conditions, and its goals. Thought is freedom in relation to what one does, the motion by which one detaches oneself from it, establishes it as an object, and reflects on it as a problem"⁸⁴. In the Introduction to *L'usage des plaisirs*, Foucault explained that he conceived of philosophy as an attempt to discover "to what extent the work of thinking its own history can free thought from that which it thinks silently and let it think otherwise"⁸⁵. The challenge is precisely to free thought from itself, that is, from what has become its habit in order to enable it to think otherwise.

Importantly, Foucault posits thought as separation; thought happens – if it ever does – as a step back, which means thought always marks the distance between what one does and what or who one is. As a consequence, thought is unconditional: it cannot be limited by the circumstances in which one acts and lives. Thought is cut-off from the circumstances of thought. Foucault calls the exercise of thought, this freedom, an *askesis*, "un exercice de soi, dans la pensée"⁸⁶, which means the work of philosophy – of the philosopher – instances the transformation of the subject (of him or herself) such that he or she is "freed" from the conditions of life.

What does it mean that the philosopher is (or can become) free from his or her circumstances? It means that through certain practices or techniques of the self, the philosopher becomes capable of *parrhesia*, which

83 FOUCAULT, Michel. "Polémique, politique, problématisations". In: *Dits et écrits II. 1976-1988*. Defert, Daniel and Ewald, François (editors) (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 2004), 1417; "Polemic, Politics, Problematizations". In: *The Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984: Volume One, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth*. Rabinow, Paul (ed.) (New York: The New Press, 1997), 118-119.

84 *Ibid.*, 1416; *ibid.*, 117.

85 FOUCAULT, Michel. *L'usage des plaisirs: Histoire de la sexualité. Volume 2* (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1984), 15; FOUCAULT, Michel. *The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality. Volume 2*. Howard, Richard (trans.) (New York: Vintage, 1990), 8.

86 *Ibidem*.

Foucault translates as “franc-parler” (frank speech or outspokenness⁸⁷), and defines as “speech that is equivalent to commitment, to a bond, and which establishes a certain pact between the subject of enunciation and the subject of conduct”⁸⁸. The truth the philosopher speaks is, then, not a truth of knowledge, but rather the truth of the subject in its completion or fulfillment. “The truth enlightens the subject; the truth gives beatitude to the subject; the truth gives the subject tranquility of the soul. In short, there is, in the truth and in access to the truth, something that fulfills the subject himself, which fulfills [*accomplit*] the being itself of the subject”⁸⁹. In speaking the truth I commit myself to doing what I say and thus “to be the subject of conduct that... conforms in every respect [*point par point*] to the truth [I] express”⁹⁰. On Foucault’s account, “The basis of *parrhesia* is... this *adæquatio* between the subject who speaks, and who speaks the truth and the subject who conducts himself as this truth requires”⁹¹. That is, “effectivement je suis, comme sujet de ma conduit, absolument, intégralement et totalement identique au sujet d’énonciation que je suis, quand je te dis ce que je te dis”⁹². I am what I say I am. My intention is not divided. In *L’usage de plaisir*, Foucault gives the following example: “The accent was placed on the relationship with the self that enabled a person to keep from being carried away by the appetites and pleasures, to maintain a mastery and superiority over them [*de garder vis-à-vis d’eux maîtrise et supériorité*], to keep his senses in a state of tranquility, to remain free from interior bondage to the passions [*de demeurer libre de tout esclavage intérieur à l’égard des passions*], and to achieve a mode of being that could be defined by the full enjoyment of oneself, or the perfect supremacy of oneself over oneself [*ou la parfait souveraineté de soi sur soi*]”⁹³. This is the figure of absolute, undivided sovereignty that Hobbes theorized even though his own analysis of time, sense, and language makes clear that such sovereignty is impossible.

The absolute identity of enunciation and conduct, the perfection and absolution of intention, would only be possible were the subject capable of freeing itself from itself, from its passions, thereby overcoming its enslavement to others and to the world. Foucauldian *Parrhesia* is possible only on this basis. The one who speaks frankly — the one who is what he/she is — must be completed, fulfilled; he or she must be full of him or herself.

87 For examples, see: FOUCAULT, *L’herméneutique*, 370, 372, 381. On *parrhesia*, see: LÉVY, Carlos. “From Politics to Philosophy and Theology: Some Remarks about Foucault’s Interpretation of *Parrêsia* in Two Recently Published Seminars”. *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 42.4 (2009): 313-325; and Nikolopoulou. *Tragically Speaking*, 93-118

88 FOUCAULT, Michel. *L’herméneutique*, 389; FOUCAULT, Michel. *Hermeneutics*, 406.

89 *Ibid.*, 18; *ibid.*, 16.

90 *Ibid.*, 389; *ibid.*, 406.

91 *Ibid.*, 388; *ibid.*, 406.

92 *Ibid.*, 389; *ibid.*, 406.

93 FOUCAULT, Michel. *L’usage*, 38; *Use*, 31

In a word, the one who practices *parrhesia* is finished (“accomplished”). Foucault would not have disagreed. He follows Seneca’s advice that one must “Act as if you were pursued, you should live as fast as you can, throughout your life you should feel as if there were enemies at your back, people pursuing you”⁹⁴. And who are these enemies we ought to fear? Still following Seneca, Foucault writes:

These enemies are the accidents and mishaps of life. Above all they are the passions and disorders these accidents may produce in you, precisely insofar as you are young or adult and still hope for something, insofar as you are attached to pleasure and covet power or money. These are the enemies pursuing you. So, you must flee from these pursuing enemies, and you must flee as quickly as possible. Hasten towards the place that offers you a safe shelter⁹⁵.

We know where that is. Because we can never live our lives fast enough, because, for so long as we live, we cannot escape the accidents of life, Seneca advises that “we should place ourselves in a condition such that we live it [our life] as if it is already over... We must complete our life before our death”⁹⁶. And Foucault quotes Seneca: “[c]onsummare vitam ante mortem.” We must complete our life before our death, we must fulfill our life before the moment of death arrives, we must achieve perfect satiety of ourselves. ‘*Summa tui satietas*’: perfect, complete satiety of yourself”⁹⁷. Die before you are dead. Live life as if you were dead.

There is an enormous difference between the advice to live each day as if it were your last and to live each day as if you were already dead. The one affirms life and the future to come. It mandates care of the self as coextensive with life. To live life as if every day were the last day means, precisely, to care, no matter how that “care” manifests itself, whether as love or the struggle to avoid the pain the world may bring. It is the promise of life. This is Hobbes. But to live life as if it were already over means not to care at all, not to desire or to be moved by desire, to have no passion⁹⁸. The absolute identity of enunciation and conduct means to be full, satiated, completed, hence without any anticipation of a future to come. It thus means to be without fear. In a word, it means to be dead. This is Foucault. It is worth asking, however, how one could ever “fearlessly” speak the truth –and

94 FOUCAULT, Michel. *L’herméneutique*, 107; FOUCAULT, Michel. *Hermeneutics*, 110.

95 *Ibidem*; *ibidem*..

96 *Ibid.*, 107; *ibid.*, 110-111.

97 *Ibid.*, 108; *ibid.*, 111.

98 On the absence of “passion” in Foucault’s late seminars, see: LÉVY, Carlos. “From Politics to Philosophy and Theology: Some Remarks about Foucault’s Interpretation of *Parrêsia* in Two Recently Published Seminars”. *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 42.4, 313-315.

what difference such a truth would make— if we were to follow Foucault's advice? If I were to live as if I were dead, unattached to the world, about what would I care to speak the truth? Isn't it the case, rather, that telling the truth, speaking frankly and freely, *parrhesia*, demands that one care about others and about oneself, that one be, therefore, exposed to the accidents of life and, as a consequence, that one be fearful, that one both fear the future and fear for it? The accidents of life are the condition of possibility of passion and, thus, of caring for the self. But they are also why we fear and, thus, why we are always at war with ourselves and with others. Care is the name of this war. Does not Foucault rather ask us to rest in peace? There is no promise in that.

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