



## War and a Semblance of Peace in the Inca Heartland

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### Introduction

What has been written about Andean warfare has largely been about the Incas (Murra 1978; Rowe 1946; Bram 1941). This is understandable since we rely on what was written by the Spaniards who were almost the only writers, and they were mainly interested in learning about the Incas. Sometimes, when the documents draw from oral testimony -such as a questionnaire- or from local historical genres, we can begin to describe cultural practice as an ethnographer might. What I would like to do in this paper -rather than repeat what others have done- is work closely with a certain group of written sources that offer a perspective on how Inca warfare developed from local practice in one region of the Andes: the region between Jauja and Cuzco. This is a very narrow focus, but I want to try to isolate the voices of particular individuals about the events of a century or more before. And since there are always different stories about what happened in the past, I will try to elicit perspectives from both the Incas and those who were incorporated into their empire.

One of my sources -the transcripts of interviews conducted by members of the entourage of the Viceroy Francisco de Toledo in 1570-71 as he traveled from Lima to Cuzco and in Cuzco- have been largely ignored as a source on warfare. The transcripts are known as the *Informaciones* of Toledo. They were conducted with the use of various questionnaires. Some questions were

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directed toward how local people governed themselves before the Inca expansion, both in times of peace and times of war. The interview material can be considered in light of information collected from Inca informants in roughly the same period about the conquest of these same peoples. All of these materials have been put through cultural and linguistic filters, but even the process of translation does not entirely obliterate the voices of the Spaniard's informants.

Although there are difficulties inherent in using written sources (duly noted in the following section), these materials are valuable as sources of information about warfare. Through careful use of them, Inca warfare can be placed on a historical continuum that includes the preceding period. A great deal depends on our understanding of Andean political organization on the eve of the Inca expansion. We cannot assume that it was uniform, but rather, when the people who were interviewed speak about their own situation, try to learn about it. Of course we would like to construct a reliable history of events, and from it, try to understand what was at stake when groups engaged in conflict; how relations with particular enemies were conceptualized; how a fight was won or lost; what preparations were made; what occurred afterward, and particularly, how loss of life was mediated; whether aggressive encounters resolved issues or simply increased the likelihood of future conflict; and many other such questions. The source materials do not lend themselves to answering these questions in a very satisfying way, but a surprising amount can still be learned from listening to what Andean people told Spaniards in those years.

### **The Written Source Materials**

The transcripts of Toledo's interviews, the *Informaciones*, were conducted in a series of highland towns on the main Inca road between Jauja and Cuzco in 1571-72.<sup>1</sup> All of those interviewed were men, and all had been baptized. The individuals interviewed appear to have been chosen because of their advanced age: all had been adults by 1533, the year Pizarro and his men arrived in Cuzco, so they knew something about Inca rule. They were being questioned, then, about a time some 40 years earlier. They were also asked questions about the pre-Inca period. The area between Jauja and Cuzco had been conquered early, about a century or a bit more before the Spanish arrival. Of course these men could not talk about this time from personal

<sup>1</sup>The *Informaciones* were published by Roberto Levillier (1940, vol.2). Two documents from the Archivo General de Indias (AGI) were included, the "Ynformaciones hechas por el Virey del Peru don Francisco de Toledo en averiguacion del origen y gobierno de los Yncas, 1570-72" (AGI Lima 28B), and the "Ynformacion de las idolatrias de los Yncas e indios y de como se enterraban, 1571" (AGI Patronato 294, n.º. 6). I have made a new transcription of the archival originals and will cite them in this paper. All references cited simply by folios are to Lima 28B.

knowledge. Still, they replied, and some replied in detail, mentioning their sources -often their fathers and grandfathers whose names they gave. As always in such instances, some witnesses knew more than others, or were more willing to elaborate their answers. Although the questions were general, the respondents often seem to reply in terms of what they knew about their own region.

What has made these interviews problematic is that they formed part of Viceroy Toledo's campaign to deny Spanish recognition of the legitimacy of Inca rule and to undermine the structure of authority in the Andes in general.<sup>2</sup> Toledo would claim that Spain had wrongly recognized the Inca dynastic line as legitimate. They were not natural lords, he argued, but tyrants. There were no hereditary local lords, either, since the Incas freely named and removed members of local lineages to provincial administrative posts. The king of Spain, then, had a free hand in reorganizing the structure of authority at all levels (Letter of Francisco de Toledo to the King, Cuzco, 1 march 1572; ff. 1-5v). The interviews were conducted by members of the viceroy's entourage while he traveled to Cuzco and during his stay there. Several, successive questionnaires were administered. A reading of the first indicates that Toledo initially made an effort to collect real information from people who knew something (ff. 14v-16). The questions were open-ended, and were asked of particular individuals. Later, when Toledo learned what kind of responses could be expected, the questionnaire was redesigned so that the answers only confirmed particular points (ff. 48-49v). To increase consensus, the new questionnaire was administered to groups of witnesses, sometimes as many as twenty-two. The people in each group had diverse origins, so their answers could not be specific to a particular people or place. For these reasons, the answers do not have the same value as those elicited in the first interviews. A third questionnaire, dealing with "idolatry" and "unnatural practices" was designed and administered in Cuzco (AGI, Patronato 294, no. 6, ff. 1-2v, see note 1); the answers include nothing of interest on the topic of warfare. In addition to these questionnaires, two other types of interviews were conducted in Cuzco. Five Spaniards who had come with Pizarro were asked what they knew of Inca rule, based on what they had seen or learned from native people at the time (f. 128). Some Inca practices related to warfare were strange and horrifying to Spaniards, so the interviews incorporate information about such things. Finally, groups of people who had inhabited the Cuzco valley before the Incas arrived were questioned about how the Incas

<sup>2</sup> An additional problem with them is that one of the interpreters who participated in the *Informaciones*, Gonzalo Gómez Jiménez, was later accused of maliciously misinterpreting testimony (Murra 2002: 434). The accusation was specifically lodged against his participation in a trial against Don Carlos Inca and other prominent Incas in 1572, but the accusation casts a shadow over other proceedings in which he participated as interpreter. In the case of the *Informaciones*, however, he did not serve as interpreter in the Jauja interviews, joining the Toledo entourage only after it reached Guamanga.

came to dominate their territory (ff. 135-135v). Although the questions were administered to a group of individuals, all were from the same group and spoke about their specific experience. These interviews are particularly valuable because they tell us something about the Inca homeland prior to the time the Incas dominated the Cuzco valley, let alone a larger territory. We have some information, then, about the Incas that can be put into the same framework as the testimony of the other peoples interviewed by Toledo.

In addition to the *Informaciones*, there are other narrative histories that include information about warfare in the same region. Viceroy Toledo had a history of the Incas composed by his cosmographer Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa (the second part of his *Historia Indica*). Members of the Inca dynastic lineage, assembled to hear a reading of the manuscript, were asked to verify it. Another group of Incas had been asked a month before to verify the same history painted on cloths - a historical format familiar to the members of the dynastic lineage, who remembered a painted history kept during the time of the Inca empire (Julien 1999). The project was to collect an account from the mouths of the Incas that reflected what they knew about their past. As might be expected, when Sarmiento expresses an opinion, he exhibits the same biases as Viceroy Toledo. Just so, he represents the Incas, wherever he can, as cruel tyrants. What the Incas knew about their own past could easily be used against them, and we have no reason to think that the content of the *Historia Indica* had to be manipulated to get what the Viceroy wanted. Sarmiento drew on Inca genres, and the *Historia Indica* is an important source for our purposes (Julien 2000a). The Inca conquest of the region between Cuzco and Jauja occurred during the lifetime of Pachacuti, the 9th Inca, and Sarmiento's account appears to have been drawn largely from a life history of this Inca, recorded on *quipos* and kept by members of his lineage. Another author who drew from this Inca source is Juan de Betanzos, who uses it in his *Suma y narración* (1987 [1551-57]). The first part of Betanzos' manuscript - on the prehispanic past - was written two decades before Viceroy Toledo arrived in Cuzco, while the *quipos* were still in the hands of Pachacuti's lineage (Julien 2000a: 128-29). Betanzos was an interpreter who spoke the Inca language well, so had no need of translators. He was also married to a high-born woman of the lineage of the 10th Inca, and could have known and conversed with those who kept the *quipos*. What Betanzos wrote can be used to check Sarmiento, but it is extremely valuable in its own right, since Betanzos' account more closely reflects the conceptual universe of the Incas.

The *Informaciones* and the two historical narratives which drew from Inca sources are our principal source materials. When other material is relevant, it will be mentioned in passing.

## **The *Informaciones*: Witnesses from the Region between Jauja and Cuzco**

Before beginning, there is one caveat: the questions and answers of the *Informaciones* rely on terms drawn from a Spanish vocabulary, so some discussion of Spanish forms of political organization is necessary. At the time of these interviews, there were competing forms of political organization in the Spanish conceptual repertory: one, the *señorío*, or hereditary lordship, involved both a tribute right over a territory and civil and criminal jurisdiction; another, *behetría* or *comunidades*, was the free community, still subject to royal authority but under a local lord of its choice (Glick 1979, chp. 4). The *señorío* had been gaining ground since the eleventh century, but it was to make a real surge in growth in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It is clear from Toledo's attitude toward the *behetría*, that he thought it to be an inferior form of organization. The third question of the first questionnaire asked specifically if towns were governed "in the manner of *behetría* or *comunidades*" (f. 14v). Clearly, the viceroy's purposes were served when the witnesses said that there had been no hereditary lords before the Incas.

The very first interviews in Jauja brought these issues to the fore. Four of those interviewed were *caciques* (the Caribbean term used everywhere in the Americas to describe local headmen) of the subdivision of Huringuancas, one of three subdivisions of the Jauja province. One of the witnesses, Felipe Poma Macao, had been a *curaca* (the local term for a hereditary provincial official in Inca administration, which was often used synonymously with *cacique*, see Julien 1982: 122-126). Specifically, he had been head of a *pachaca* (an administrative unit of 100 households). He testified that, before the time of the empire, there had been *cinchecona*, or captains in time of war. They had not been hereditary, but were chosen on the basis of their abilities, as observed in combat situations (f. 28v). His testimony was seconded by other Huringuanca witnesses. The name *cinchecona* was translated by more than one Huringuanca witness as "now this one is valiant" (*agora es este valiente*, f. 17). Another witness, Hernando Apachin, a *curaca* as well, noted that each town (*pueblo*)<sup>3</sup> governed itself "in the manner of communities" (*a manera de comunidad*, f. 32), and here the interpreter is supplying a comparison to Spanish forms. Another witness, Alonso Cama, testified that *cinchecona* were chosen when the town had to defend itself. Someone who might become *cinchecona* was the sort of person who would inspire the people to fight and

<sup>3</sup> A *pueblo* was more than just the name of a settlement. It was the lowest rung in a hierarchy of three urban forms in the Americas: city (*ciudad*), villa (*villa*) and town (*pueblo*). In Spain, the term *lugar* was used instead of *pueblo* to refer to the same form. All of these urban forms had a rural territory associated with them, though in the case of *villas* and *pueblos*, this was not extensive. There is another use of the word *pueblo* that we should consider: it also referred generally to "a people". I think the Jauja witnesses are using the term to refer to a small, local jurisdiction.

who would himself fight in the vanguard. A person became *cinchecona* after demonstrating these traits. None of the Huringuanca witnesses mentioned inheritance of the position by descendants. Only one noted that the *cinchecona* served in peace as well as wartime (f. 28).

The first witness, Hernando Apachin, testified that the wars were fought “for women and for lands”. He also indicated that *cincheconas* actually promoted conflict:

These *cincheconas* wanted there to be continuous warfare since the people would hold festivals in their honor and respect them more; and when they defeated some towns, the women would come out with jugs of maize beer and other things to offer them so that they would not kill them, and the young girls likewise, and they would offer themselves to these *cincheconas*, to be their women (f. 33).

Alonso Cama also confirmed what Apachin said about the interest of the *cincheconas* in promoting conflicts (f. 36v-37).

One of the witnesses was not from Jauja: Diego Lucana was in charge of the Cañares, Chachapoyas and Llaquas (f. 22), all of them *mitimaes* (colonists) settled there by the Incas (Rowe 1982). There is no telling which of these groups he was from, but the first two are in the north highlands, a great distance from Jauja, and it is likely that he came from that region. Lucana testified that, before the Incas, *cincheconas* were chosen because they were valiant in war, and that they “were respected” in peacetime. Before the Incas, there had been no large provinces, nor any tribute. He also said that *cincheconas* had been around since the “creation of the world”, and that some had emerged from springs, others from rivers, others from rocks and others from narrow holes (f. 23v). Lucana appears to be describing a primordial form of government.

Lucana, unlike the other Huringuanca witnesses, or any of the other witnesses interviewed in the region between Jauja and Cuzco, indicated that there was an expectation that the offspring of a *cinchecona* would be *cinchecona* as well:

...and if, in the lifetime of a *cinchecona* it happened that a *cinchecona* had sons, and he sent some of them to war with some people, and when it happened that one fought valiantly, the people said he would be a good *cinchecona* and they elected him to the office, and he became *cinchecona* after the death of his father and he looked after them and defended them. And if a *cinchecona* had two or three able and valiant sons, they were all elected as *cincheconas*, and when the sons of the *cincheconas* were young, they named others until they were older, but if they were not valiant, they were not elected to be *cincheconas* (f. 24).

Inheritance of the qualities associated with being *cinchecona* was expected, but these had, nonetheless, to be demonstrated.

Lucana was head of the Cañar *mítimaes*. Precisely for the Cañar region, there is evidence for hereditary rulers. In the *Historia Indica*, the leader of the Cañares was identified as Cañar Capac, or “the *capac* of the Cañares” (Sarmiento de Gamboa 1906, chp. 44: 87). Sarmiento’s sources were Incas, so here we are dealing with Inca understandings. The Incas themselves were *capac*, that is, they recognized a hereditary status that passed through the descendants of Manco Capac and a sister, who had emerged from the central window at Tambotoco, eleven generations before the Spaniards arrived. Capac status was not something the Incas had known they possessed all along: it was revealed to them in several episodes by a solar deity connected with warfare (Julien 2000a: 23-42). The Incas Sarmiento interviewed described the leaders of a number of powerful prehispanic groups as *capac*. They were obstacles to the Inca expansion, and the Cañar Capac was one of them. Diego Lucana’s testimony, despite the use of the term *cinchecona*, accords well with what Inca sources said about the Cañar region. What he tells us, however, is not that *cinchecona* status was inherited, but that there was an expectation that the qualities associated with it would transfer to the next generation. These qualities still had to be demonstrated. This also appears to have been the case with *capac* status.

The contrast between Diego Lucana’s testimony and that given by the Huringuanca witnesses may reflect significant differences in local organization. Toledo’s *Informaciones* were not the first place where the term *behetría* had been used to describe the political organization of the Jauja valley before the time of the Inca empire. Pedro de Cieza de León, who traveled through the valley in 1548, described the division of the valley into three *parcialidades* (subdivisions) by the Incas, but noted that the region had been characterized by *behetría* before that. Cieza noted that the people of the Jauja valley were all Guancas and had a common origin myth: they descended from ancestors who emerged from a spring called Guaribilca. Perhaps he used the term *behetría* to characterize the political organization of the valley because the Guancas had not been united under one lord (1984, chp. 84: 242-43). When we consider the testimony of the Huringuanca witnesses, only one said anything about the effective size of political units. Alonso Pomaguala testified that “each *parcialidad* had a *cinchecona*, and that in this valley of Jauja, up to the moiety of the Ananguancas, the *cincheconas* took care of them” (f. 17v). He seems to be indicating that, although there were divisions in the valley, the political units were not necessarily small. He may also be telling us that there had been an effective boundary between the territory that later became Huringuanca and Ananguanca. Alonso Camo, also from Huringuanca, confirms this impression: the towns near each other got along well; the conflict was with towns that were “not so close”. These more distant people would attack them to take their lands and their women (ff. 37-37v).

So far, the witnesses are talking about defense. An armed response to an attack was not the only option: some witnesses gave evidence that a choice between war and peace -on the aggressor's terms- could be offered. Diego Lucana testified that, when a town did not want to peacefully submit, the *cincheconas* and their followers would make war on them, kill them and take their lands. If people decided to submit peacefully, they would keep their lands and become "vassals" of the others (f. 24-24v). Just what was expected from these "vassals" is unknown, beyond implicit subordination. Alonso Camo, one of the Jauja witnesses, also talked about negotiated peace:

When one place [*lugar*] or town/people [*pueblo*] defeated another, they [the aggressors] took their lands and destroyed them and killed the people, but when they [the aggressors] came in peace and the people swore obedience to them, the people were allowed to stay in their towns, and no damage was done to them. And they [the aggressors] would say that they wanted to speak with them, and that they [the people] should not be afraid because they came in peace (f. 37v).

A choice was offered between war and peace. In the case of war, the people attacked stood to lose everything, not just their lands. What did the aggressor gain if peace was chosen? The people swore their obedience, but what did this mean? Perhaps some kind of tribute was expected afterwards, although many witnesses testified that they had not paid tribute to an overlord before the Incas. Another possibility is that the people who were subordinated became allies: subordinate in status, but free, except when their superiors called on them for support, perhaps to go to war but perhaps for defense.

This choice is mentioned by other witnesses in the towns between Jauja and Cuzco. The people interviewed also corroborated most of the testimony of the Jauja witnesses. The next town was Guamanga (modern Ayacucho). There, Antonio Guaman Cucho, from the town of Chirua in Tanquigua (Cook 1975: 278), gave much the same testimony as the Jauja witnesses. Guaman Cucho added to the repertory of choices arising from attack by one group on another:

This witness had heard from his father and grandfather and other oldtimers that sometimes they [the aggressors] would take part of their chacaras [cultivated fields] and leave others. When the local people who had fled learned about it, they could get their lands back by trading animals and cloth (f. 41v).

One of the choices open, then, was flight. What seems to be described in the above statement is that some local people fled, while others stayed. Those who fled lost their lands. Nothing was said about what happened to the others, and they may have simply been left alone.



This situation does not seem to be motivated by a desire for land, since there would have been little reason to return the land if it had. Still, one of the Jauja witnesses, Felipe Poma Macao, gave classic materialist reasons for territorial expansion:

When one *pueblo* experienced a large expansion in its population, it would provoke wars with others to take their *chacaras* [cultivated fields], foodstuffs and women... (f. 28v).

We do not know how common it was to go to war over land, but a number of witnesses mentioned it. Taking land was usually accompanied by killing the people on it. As Don Felipe Poma Macao noted: "when some towns defeated others, they killed all the people and took over their lands and their towns and divided them up among themselves and their captains, setting their own boundary markers" (f. 29). There is no real evidence that Andean people thought of land as a commodity of any kind, or even, as something separable from the people who inhabited it. In fact, everything we know about the relation of people to the landscape -the rocks, springs and other natural features associated with it- suggests that people were firmly rooted to their territories. Killing everyone may have been the only means of breaking this bond.

On the other hand, killing everyone may have been a means of preventing retaliation. Only one witness mentioned revenge as part of the cycle of conflict, however. Baltasar Guaman Llamoca, from the province of Soras, (in the highlands south of Ayacucho) explained what happened after a successful raid:

When some people defeated others, and the defeated people fled, the winners arrived in their town and took their wives, women, clothing, livestock and everything they could find and left. When the people from that town returned, they made alliances with other groups and went to war again over what had been taken from them (f. 45).

This situation sounds like the other side of the coin of the one described above -in this instance there was no intention of restoring what had been taken. It should also be noted, the conflict was not over land.

Fighting for the sheer purpose of taking spoils -what we could call raiding- can have been an end in itself. It was also the result of a successful campaign that may have been motivated by other reasons. Two witnesses describe the division of spoils. One was Juan Chancavilca, from Parinacochas (in the highlands south of Ayacucho), who noted that the *cinchecona* divided the spoils among all those who had participated, and did not just keep it all for themselves (f. 52). The other Parinacochas witness, Alonso Quia Guanaco, said the same thing (f. 50).

In addition to the reasons given, there were other, seemingly more minor provocations that could result in armed conflict. Alonso Quia Guanaco, also from Parinacochas, said they went to war over “very small matters, like stealing firewood in the territory of others, or cutting pasture, or because of some offense committed by a particular person” (f. 50). Two Incas, interviewed in towns close to Cuzco, also mentioned similar causes for aggression. Cristóbal Cusi Guaman, interviewed in Limatambo, said that wars might result from taking firewood and pasture from the lands of others (f. 56). Joan Sona, interviewed in the town of Mayo, said that wars over water and lands were very ordinary and that arguments, too, brought about armed conflict (f. 67). These sound more like local matters, suggesting that nearby towns did not always get along as well as one of the witnesses suggested.

**The Informaciones: Witnesses from the Cuzco Valley**

Compared with the generalizations about past warfare collected from witnesses along the road from Jauja to Cuzco, the testimony given by the peoples of the Cuzco valley was specifically about how the Incas had taken their lands. Because they are also talking about warfare before the Incas began to organize an empire, what they say is fairly comparable to what the other witnesses said and helps to locate the Incas in the same universe. Of the three groups interviewed, two were related to the Incas -the *ayllo* (here lineage) descended from Sauasiray and the *ayllo* descended from Ayar Ucho (also called Alcabizas). The third, known as the Guallas- was not. The groups may have been treated differently by the Incas because of kin ties or a lack thereof, so I will present these cases in some detail. The *Historia Indica*, by Sarmiento, can be used to put the events described by the witnesses into a chronological framework, so I will use the sequence found in his narrative. His account was based on an Inca genealogical account that spanned 11 generations. The following is a rough correlation<sup>4</sup> with the European calendar:

- |  |                               |
|--|-------------------------------|
| 1) Spanish arrival in Cuzco  | December 1533                 |
| 2) Death of the 11th Inca  | About 1526-28                 |
| 3) Beginning of the Inca expansion,<br>when the 9th Inca was young | Beginning of the 14th century |

<sup>4</sup> Sarmiento correlates the rule of each Inca to the Christian calendar, but using these dates even as an estimate has caused real misunderstandings. Some of us who accept the Inca genealogy as a representation of the succession of Inca generations in real time are comfortable using references to the Inca genealogy and avoid using calendar dates entirely. This may not be enough for those who do not know the sequence of rulers and events associated with them, so I have come up with a solution that does not appear to present Sarmiento’s dates as “real”. What I have done is to estimate the period of effective authority in each Inca generation at 30 years, and projected backward from the time of death of the 11th Inca just before the Spanish arrival.

- |   |                   |
|---|-------------------|
| 4) Consolidation of Inca control<br>in the Cuzco Valley, when the 4th<br>Inca was young | Mid 12th century  |
| 5) The time of origins, when the<br>1st Inca and his siblings crawled<br>out of a cave  | Late 11th century |

The Inca genealogical account that supplies the general chronology for the *Historia Indica*, begins with a story about Manco Capac and his seven siblings crawling out of the central window of three at Tambotoco, a site about 25 km. south of Cuzco. The siblings made several intermediate stops before settling permanently in Cuzco, residing for years in each place. The final place of residence before their move to Cuzco was a place called Matagua. The Inca odyssey is described in terms of looking for good lands (Sarmiento de Gamboa 1906, chp. 12: 35). To test a site for potential settlement, a *vara* (rod) was thrown. How it penetrated the ground was read as a sign of fertility. When the Inca siblings finally reached the Cuzco valley, one of the women, Mama Guaco, threw two *varas*, both of gold. The one that revealed fertile soil landed in Guanaypata, a place inhabited by the Guallas, “two arquebus shots from Cuzco”, and near a Spanish arch at the edge of the early colonial city where the Inca road leading to the Lake Titicaca region departed (Sarmiento de Gamboa 1906, chp. 13: 38-39). Between Sarmiento and the members of this group interviewed in the Toledo *Informaciones*, a very bloody story of conquest is told. Returning first to Matagua, Manco Capac, the brother who was the progenitor of the dynastic line, sent another brother off to a stone boundary-marker where the church of Santo Domingo stands today. The brother went to the appointed place, sat there and turned to stone, becoming a marker of Inca possession of the site. Moving to the spot where the brother had marked the site of Cuzco, the Incas also began their campaign to usurp the water and lands of the Guallas (Sarmiento de Gamboa 1906, chp. 13: 39-40).

Fifteen Guallas were interviewed in Cuzco during the Toledo interviews. They testified that they had come from Pachatusan. Their lands were on some terraces on a slope past San Blas, one of the parishes of Cuzco. The Incas had introduced people into their lands on two occasions. Out of fear of Inca cruelty, the Guallas fled with their *cinchecona* Apo Caua to look for new lands, settling 20 leagues [100 km.] from Cuzco, in a town named after them where they still lived at the time of the interview (ff. 139-140v).

The Guallas say nothing about an act of extreme cruelty that occurred during an Inca attack, but Sarmiento does. He described how the Guallas resisted the Incas until Mama Guaco, Manco Capac's sister, killed a Gualla and “made pieces out of him”. With his entrails, heart and lungs in her mouth and a *haybinto* (a stone tied to a cord) in her hands, she went after the other Guallas with “diabolical determination” (Sarmiento de Gamboa 1906, chp. 13: 39-40). Sarmiento is likely to magnify any kind of negative statement about

the Incas, but other authors tell versions of the same story. The Guallas fled, perhaps because fighting would mean extermination.

The next round of aggression occurred when the Incas reached a place just southwest of Cuzco, where a *cinchecona* named Copalimayta came out to meet them. Copalimayta was an outsider to the Cuzco valley, but he had been chosen as *cinchecona* by the people of Sauasiray, who inhabited a place very near where the Incas had founded Cuzco. In Sarmiento these people were represented as non-Incas. In the *Informaciones*, Sauasiray is described as having emerged from Sutictoco, one of the three windows at Tambotoco. These people were related to the Incas, though they were not direct descendants of Manco Capac. What is most likely is that those of Sauasiray and the Incas were part of the same, larger group, even though the Incas never represent themselves as subject to any higher authority (Julien 2000a: 241-243). In the fight with the Incas, Copalimayta was taken prisoner. To free himself, he left the region, giving up his lands and property. Manco Capac and Mama Guaco took what he had left, and also gained authority over his people (Sarmiento de Gamboa 1906, chp. 13: 40). There had been a battle, but the Incas had not killed the people. A negotiated settlement seems to have been the result.

Five men from the Sauasiray *ayllo* were interviewed in the Toledo interviews. They reiterate Sarmiento's statement that Sauasiray had come from Sutictoco and settled in the area near the monastery of Santo Domingo, where no one else lived. The nearest people were the Guallas. They say nothing about resisting the Incas, so their testimony merely establishes their priority in the region and the defeat of their *cinchecona* (f. 136).

The next group who resisted the Incas was the Alcabizas. They were settled "half an arquebus shot from the Incas, at the place where the convent of Santa Clara is" (Sarmiento de Gamboa 1906, chp. 14: 41). After defeating Copalimayta, Manco Capac decided to take their lands. The Alcabizas gave him some, but Manco Capac tried to take them all or almost all. The strategy, suggested by his sister, Mama Guaco, was to take their water. The plan was a success and was accomplished without armed conflict. The Alcabizas resisted later, and I will tell that story below.

Four people identified as Alcabizas were interviewed. They were from the *ayllo* of Ayar Ucho, one of the brothers who emerged with Manco Capac from the center window at Tambotoco, that is, they were collateral kin (ff. 136v-139). In the *Historia Indica*, Ayar Ucho is also the brother who turned to stone to become the marker symbolizing the Inca possession of Cuzco. In the Inca account, he left no descendants (1906, chp. 12: 36-37). This was patently untrue, since his descendants were people Sarmiento and Toledo spoke with. Sarmiento even gives the names of some of the descendants of Ayar Ucho, flatly contradicting what he says in the next pages (1906, chp. 11: 34). The descendants of Ayar Ucho/Alcabizas say nothing about being forced off their

lands by the Incas. They only testified that the Guallas and the *ayllos* of Sauasiray and Quizco, a group that was not interviewed, were already there (f. 137).

There is another story about Inca aggression against the Alcabizas in the time of Mayta Capac, the fourth Inca (in the mid 12th century, approximately). After the initial acts of aggression which allowed the Incas to establish themselves in the Cuzco valley, there was peace for three generations. Then, the young Mayta Capac began to show signs of aggressive behavior. One day, when he was playing with some young Alcabizas and Culunchimas, Mayta Capac injured many of his playmates, killing some. Soon after, he had an argument with an Alcabiza boy over drinking water from a spring and broke the boy's leg, chasing the other Alcabizas who were with him back to their houses, where they hid. The Alcabiza adults decided that it was time to free themselves from Inca domination. They chose ten strong men and went to the place where the Incas lived, determined to kill Mayta Capac and his father, Lloque Yupangui. Mayta Capac was entertaining himself with other boys in the patio when he saw the armed men arriving. He threw a *bola* at one of them and killed him, then threw again at another. When the Alcabizas turned to run, Mayta Capac went right after them. This defeat only made the Alcabizas more determined to win their freedom. The Alcabizas and Culunchimas joined forces and went to fight Mayta Capac and his supporters. Mayta Capac won the first encounter. There was another skirmish, but Mayta Capac won the day again. In a third encounter, the Alcabizas lost because of a supernatural intervention: a disastrous hailstorm materialized out of nowhere and defeated them. Mayta Capac took their *cinchecona* prisoner, keeping him imprisoned until his death (Sarmiento de Gamboa 1906, chp. 17: 45-48).

The Alcabizas told a different story in their testimony for the *Informaciones*. They said Manco Capac had deceived them out of their lands. When he began to take them and they protested, he responded that they should all marry each other, since they were brothers. They had resisted, but Manco Capac and his people started killing them secretly at night as well as committing other acts of treachery. Every day Mayta Capac would introduce more people into their lands, killing a few more at night. Here the Alcabizas tell the story of Mama Guaco's bloody attack. In addition to sequencing this story differently, they also testified that she attacked the Sauasiray instead of the Guallas. The Alcabizas note that Mayta Capac also openly attacked their *cinches* Apo Mayta and Cullaychima, imprisoning them in the prison of Sanzaguazi [Sangaguaci] to be tortured and killed. Mayta Capac and his people then entered their lands and took their water. They also cut open their women and took the dead fetuses from their bodies. And ever since, the Alcabizas had to pay tribute to the Incas (ff. 137v-138).

The Incas never forgot that the Alcabizas had resisted, and the Alcabizas never voluntarily served the Incas. The Incas resettled them "an arquebus shot" from where they had lived before. At the time they were interviewed they

lived in Cayocache, where the parish of Belén had just been founded, probably on the site of Qoripata (Rowe 1994). Mayta Capac and those who succeeded him always kept a close watch on the Alcabizas because they knew the Alcabizas would take their revenge if they could. The day came when the Spaniards arrived. Gualpa Roca, an Alcabiza, collected gold and silver to give to the Spaniards to help them defeat the Incas, over and above the exaction collected to ransom Atahuallpa. The Alcabizas favored the Spaniards in hopes that the Spaniards would help them get their lands back from the Incas. The Incas knew about this Alcabiza treason, and the witnesses noted that, if the Spaniards had not successfully defeated and controlled the Incas, the Incas would have killed all of them (ff. 138-138v).

The picture of conflict in the Cuzco valley is one of competition for lands and power. The Incas initially despoiled the Guallas of their lands, and only later took the lands belonging to the Alcabizas, moving them to another location in the Cuzco valley. The difference between the way the Guallas and the Alcabizas were treated may have been due to the relationships between these groups and the Incas. The Guallas were neither close nor distant relatives of the Incas. The other groups were related in some way to the Incas and managed to coexist with them for some time. The Incas quickly established authority over the Sauasirays at the time Manco Capac and his siblings first arrived in the area. In the transfer of power between the *cinchecona* chosen by the Sauasirays and Manco Capac, no battles or loss of lands were reported. There is no evidence that the Incas challenged the Alcabizas initially, perhaps because they were much closer kin. If we accept what the Alcabizas said about what happened, Manco Capac used this relationship when he approached them, arguing that they were brothers and should marry. The Incas tell a story about defeating the Alcabizas in the time of the 4th Inca. The defeat is represented as the outcome of several battles, the last of which was clearly won by supernatural forces favoring the Incas. The Alcabizas talk about Inca treachery, including the quiet murder of people in their homes and their replacement by Inca usurpers in the light of day. As descendants of one of Manco Capac's brothers, these people had as much claim to the supernatural status claimed by the Incas as the Incas did themselves. One act of Inca aggression was directed against the unborn Alcabizas, apparently an effort to obliterate such claims. Here, we have to choose between conflicting versions of events. Were the Alcabizas despoiled of their lands through armed conflict, or was there another kind of campaign against them?

The Alcabizas constituted a serious problem for the Incas -one that came back to haunt them. Where the extermination of a group could have been the solution to present and future problems, it was not really an option when empire was the goal. Acquiring an empire was not about acquiring lands and irrigation water. It was about acquiring power over people. Although there are cases of Inca extermination of specific populations, more was to be gained

through negotiated peace. Betanzos and Sarmiento -the two historical narratives that most reflect Inca perspectives- tell us about both.

### **Betanzos on Inca Warfare**

The first witnesses interviewed for the *Informaciones* were Huringuancas from the Jauja valley, who were the last of the peoples on the road between Cuzco and Jauja and were annexed to the Inca empire after the others, who were nearer. Rather than work in reverse, I will again use the chronological framework of the historical narratives (by Betanzos and Sarmiento) to tell the story. The Incas who gave their story to Betanzos and Sarmiento were less constrained by the questionnaire format to stick to particular topics, so there is a richer picture of warfare to be gleaned from their narratives.

The Inca expansion had begun in some fashion -if we take into account what both the Incas and the other peoples of the Cuzco valley told Sarmiento and Toledo- in the time of Mayta Capac, the 4th Inca (mid-12th century?). Quite a lot happened before the time the Incas began to annex the region to their north, and there is a story in Betanzos and Sarmiento about the growth of Inca power through marriage alliance with groups at the regional level (Julien 2000a: 233-253). What I will do here is move forward to the time of Pachacuti, the 9th Inca (early 15th century?). A life history exists for this Inca which both Betanzos and Sarmiento appear to have used (Julien 2000a: 93-130). Recorded on *quipos*, it was still in the possession of his *panaca* (lineage) at the time Betanzos wrote in 1551 (Julien 2000a: 128-29). It begins with the invasion of Cuzco by the Chancas, a group from the region between Cuzco and Jauja, and ends with Pachacuti's death. Pachacuti was personally involved in the conquest of part of the region, and the annexation of Jauja was accomplished by captains during his lifetime, so his life history spans the period of our interest.

If Pachacuti's life history were the only source, we would think the Chanca attack materialized out of thin air. Fortunately there are other ways to gain an understanding of regional power relationships at the time (Julien 2000a: 213-222). Suffice it to say here that a vacuum had been created in the region between the Chancas and the Incas by the demise of a polity known as *Quichuas* (or *Quechuas*). Both the Chancas and Incas had usurped *Quichua* territory at each end: the Chancas from the West and the Incas from the East (Julien 2000b: 139-40). It was only a matter of time until the two confronted each other. If we listen to the Inca voices transmitted by Betanzos and Sarmiento, the Chancas were a worthy enemy. I will take what is relevant to our discussion of warfare from their narratives.

Betanzos represents the Chanca lord (*señor de los Chancas*), named *Uscovilca*, as being head of a great number of people. He had six valiant captains. At the time, he resided at a place called *Paucaray*, near *Parcos*.

Because he had heard that Viracocha, the 8th Inca, was the most important lord (*señor*) in the region, he decided to go see what kind of power this Viracocha had. Betanzos also noted that Viracocha had taken this name, which meant “god”. What follows is a description of how Uscovilca traveled to Cuzco: he divided his army in three groups, one was to travel via Condesuyo (and what he means is on a parallel course to the right of the main forces), the other via Andesuyo (on a parallel course to the left) and he would lead the forces down the middle (Betanzos 1987, pt. 1, chp. 6: 22). This was a ritualized movement that imitated the movement of the sun, since right and left were defined by what was on the right and left when one stood with one’s back to the sun. The sun had a tie to warfare that the Incas were soon to use.

Uscovilca armed his people with lances, axes, maces, slings and shields, and gave them dried maize, fish and meat for the road. Then he told them that they would share in whatever livestock, women, clothing, gold and silver, slaves or other servants might be taken. Two of the captains took charge of the forces that were to travel on the right and left. These captains were wildly successful and went on conquering all the way to what is now eastern Bolivia. Uscovilca wanted to take Cuzco himself. Viracocha was not the sort who wanted to fight anyone, however, and when Uscovilca sent two messengers to offer him a choice between peaceful submission or battle, he decided on submission, given that he had had no time to call some of his principal people together. The message Viracocha sent to Uscovilca was that “he would swear his obedience and that he wanted to eat and drink with him”. As the day approached to meet with Uscovilca, Viracocha changed his mind. He decided -perhaps in consultation with others- to avoid Uscovilca entirely and to leave Cuzco. He took his people with him and installed them at Caquia Xaquixaguana, located on a towering hill above Calca (Betanzos 1987, pt. 1, chp. 6: 24-25).

The youngest of his sons, feeling that it was wrong to abandon Cuzco to the Chancas, decided to stay with some of his youthful friends and their servants, nine people in all. The young Inca let Uscovilca know that his father might swear obedience to a Chanca overlord, but he never would. Uscovilca heard the news about this plan to defend Cuzco and was overjoyed. He could fight this small contingent of Incas and celebrate a triumph: his victory would be cheap and easy. One of Uscovilca’s captains, named Tomay Guaraca, wanted the assignment, but Uscovilca kept it for himself (Betanzos 1987, pt. 1, chp. 6: 25-26; chp. 7: 27-28). Viracocha, from his refuge, only laughed at his youngest son, saying (and there is a speech in Betanzos, in first person):

Since I am a man who communicates with god, and since I have heard from him and been advised that I cannot win against Uscovilca, I left Cuzco so that Uscovilca would not bring dishonor on me and bad treatment on my people (1987, pt. 1, chp. 7: 28).



Viracocha refused to return to Cuzco to fight, but a number of important lords (*caciques y señores*) in the Cuzco area decided to support Pachacuti's cause.

The story about preparing to face the Chanca attack is long, while an account of what transpired when the Chancas got to Cuzco is surprisingly brief. The focus in Betanzos, and in Sarmiento, is on the relation between father and son, and the tie that was forged between the peoples of the Cuzco region who joined Pachacuti to resist the Chanca invasion.

On the eve of the battle, the young Pachacuti left Cuzco, and began to pray to Viracocha Pacha Yachachic, "the creator of all things". This supernatural Viracocha came and spoke to him when he was alone at the spring of Susurpuquio. In both the identity of this supernatural and in the content of the prayers (*oraciones*) this part of the story has been heavily Christianized (Betanzos 1987, pt. 1, chp. 8: 32-33). There are other descriptions of this supernatural that cast him in a more Andean guise. He can be represented as appearing as a reflection in a pool or mirror; rather than in person. Sarmiento says that he appeared as a reflection in a mirror, and that Pachacuti kept the mirror with him ever after (1906, chp. 27: 62). In any event, what this supernatural told the young Inca was that he would be successful against the Chancas.

While Betanzos narrates the events before the Inca-Chanca engagements in several chapters, the battle itself is not described at all. Uscovilca descends the hill of Carmenga (where the urban parish of Santa Ana is now located) to the center of Cuzco:

They engaged in battle and fought from the morning -which was when it began- until midday. And the events of the battle were such that a great number of Uscovilca's soldiers were killed, and none engaged that were not killed. Uscovilca himself was taken and killed, and when his people saw him captured and dead and saw the slaughter of so many of their own, they decided to retreat (Betanzos 1987, pt. 1, chp. 8: 33).

They regrouped in Xaquixaguana, not far from Cuzco along the main road, and sent for reinforcements. They also sent for the two captains who had been sent on parallel courses, who immediately returned, bringing the spoils of all their other victories. All were dismayed by the news of Uscovilca's death (Betanzos 1987, pt. 1, chp 8: 33).

What follows is the story of how young Pachacuti tried to get his father to accept the insignias of Uscovilca and the clothing and other spoils taken from the defeated Chancas.

He went to where his father was and paid him the respect that he was owed as his lord (*señor*) and father, and also put before him the insignias, weapons and clothing of the Chanca Uscovilca who he

had defeated and killed. He begged his father to tread on the insignias of the defeated enemy, and he also begged him to tread on some of Uscovilca's captains who had been taken prisoner, and who he had brought with him, and he made them lie down (Betanzos 1987, pt. 1, chp. 9: 35).

Betanzos then notes that this was how the Incas celebrated a triumph: they would bring the insignias of the defeated captains and any captains who had been taken alive and parade them into Cuzco where they would be delivered to the ruling Inca who would step on them. In this way, the Inca in authority would accept what they had done. Viracocha refused, even after numerous attempts by Pachacuti to get him to acquiesce. This story was not just about the defeat of the Chancas, it was about the overthrow of a father's authority by the son (Betanzos 1987, pt. 1, chp. 9:35-41).

There were still Chancas to be defeated, and they had confederated with the people of Xaquixaguana, west of Cuzco. This time, instead of the Chancas attacking Cuzco, Pachacuti went out to meet them. Again, there is no real information about the battle, except that it began when the sun was already high, about ten, and ended in the late afternoon.

What is important is what happened after the battle was over. First Pachacuti dealt with the Chanca's allies from Xaquixaguana. These people had braided their hair like the Chancas, a sign of their identification with the Chanca cause. After the battle, they went to Pachacuti and threw themselves on the ground before him. They said they had been unable to resist the Chancas. Many of the Incas who had fought with Pachacuti wanted them killed "since they had witnessed the deaths of Inca soldiers", but Pachacuti decided to spare them, "since they were *orejones*". *Orejones*, or "big ears", was the term the Spaniards used to describe those who wore ear spools (and, we can infer, were initiated in rites similar to the Inca rite, and hence, were Incas in some sense). But, since they were *orejones*, "they should wear their hair short". By wearing their hair long and braided, in the Chanca style, they had denied their Inca affiliation. Pachacuti sent them home and ordered his captains not to take anything that belonged to them.

The Chancas were another matter. Pachacuti had the four captains who had been tremendously successful in their campaigning brought before him. They told him all about their conquests, and how, because of their success, they had dared to attack him. Pachacuti responded that, if they had been victorious, it had been because they were following Uscovilca's orders. Since he had defeated Uscovilca, "they should have presumed that their luck had run out". To punish them and create an example for others -and perhaps, most importantly, so that they would not regroup to fight him again- he had them taken to the site of the battle and, while he was present, had many posts erected from which he ordered them to be hung. After they were hung, he ordered their heads to be cut off and placed on the posts. Their bodies were

burned to ash and the ash was thrown to the wind from the highest hills. The Chanca dead were to be left where they were lying, to serve as food for the foxes and vultures. What Pachacuti created was a gruesome memorial to the Chanca defeat. The spoils were taken to Cuzco and distributed among those who had fought, "according to the quality of the person". Then all went to their respective homes to rest (Betanzos 1987, pt. 1, chp. 10: 44-46).

There is a second story about military engagement -from an Inca point of view- which I will tell, but let me first examine some of the elements of this story that echo what the witnesses told Toledo about warfare before the time of the Inca expansion. First, a choice was offered between war or negotiated peace. This seems to be something that an aggressor who was not looking for lands might offer: going to war involved risk and what the aggressor wanted could be gained by other means. Although we might think that Uscovilca could have negotiated peace with Viracocha rather than fight Inca Yupanqui, it appears that Viracocha had reneged on the peace and was prepared to face a Chanca attack in a place where he could better defend himself. Uscovilca chose an easy victory over a hard one. Second, the Chancas were a large and powerful group, but they were still structured along the lines described by the Toledo witnesses: they were an assemblage of valiant captains, or *cincheconas*. Third, spoils were expected, and these were the same sorts of things -animals, women, metals, clothing- that were mentioned by the Toledo witnesses. Moreover, sharing the spoils was the sign of a popular captain. Uscovilca was also an astute captain, since he told those who fought that they would share in the spoils before going into battle. What is new is the description of the ritualized movement of armies, the relationship between success and supernatural favor, the ritual of triumph, and the creation of a memorial to the battle using the bodies of the enemy.

The second story is about an Inca campaign against a people southwest of Cuzco known as the Soras. The Soras campaign took place not long after the Chanca defeat, if the sense of time elapsed in the Betanzos narrative reflects the actual passage of time. Pachacuti had decided that there were too many local lords claiming to be *capac* -"there should be only one: and that was himself" (Betanzos 1987, pt. 1, chp. 18, p. 87). The way to prove one's *capac* status -to draw the logical conclusion- was in battle. "The sun was now with him", he reasoned, and we can assume that this supernatural had had something to do with his recent success. For the next three months, Pachacuti made a great number of sacrifices and had a statue made of gold he called Cacha. The statue would be clothed and would wear a particular headdress. It was small enough for a man to carry, and would be carried into battle by one man while a second man kept pace with him, shading the statue from the sun with an *achigua* (a small parasol), in the same manner that the Inca was given shade. Sacrifices were carried out the entire time this statue was being fabricated. A similar program of sacrifice was carried out during the creation of another important gold statue -known as PUNCHAO- so we can infer

that the sacrifices had to do with the statue. Just before leaving, sacrifices were made to the sun and the important *huacas* (sacred places) to insure the success of the campaign (Betanzos 1987, pt. 1, chp. 18: 87-88).

A great deal of effort during the campaign went into building roads and bridges. The road Pachacuti was building, of course, was the same road Toledo traveled in the reverse direction at the end of 1570. These were major works of engineering, and Betanzos devotes a fair amount of space to describing the making of bridges of plaited straw. As the reader might already suspect, more was said about this than about the battle that followed. At Curaguasi, a place on the road, a great number of people came and peacefully submitted. Pachacuti incorporated them into his army and went on building the road and bridges. Only after crossing the Abancay river did he meet with any resistance: the Soras had called people together to meet the Incas. Joining them were their neighbors the Lucanas and some of the remaining Chancas. Pachacuti was happy to hear the news, since "his trip would not be in vain". So he went on building the road and bridges, this time in the direction of Soras territory. Once there "he attacked them from all directions in such a manner that in short order they were defeated" (Betanzos 1987, pt. 1, chp. 18: 88-90). So much for describing Inca military strategy.

More important was what happened after the battle, as the reader might have guessed. Pachacuti divided his army in three groups, two headed by captains who were Cuzco lords (*señores*) and one by himself. One of the captains was to take his army along a parallel course through Condesuyo, and the other was to take his army along a parallel course through Andesuyo. They were to conquer as they went. Pachacuti would lead the main body of the army down the middle. But first, the prisoners were to be brought before him. Pachacuti had ordered a great many red tassels (*borlas*) made, a palm's length each, and they were brought for him to step on. He had also ordered long shirts to be made -shirts that reached to the ground. He had the tassels sewn to them and made the prisoners put them on. Then their hair was drenched with *chicha* (maize beer) and dusted with maize flour. Then the women of the important lords (*señores*) of Cuzco were sent for. They were to sing a song, with the following lyric: "Inca Yupanqui, son of the sun, defeated the Soras and put tassels on them", followed by the refrain "*hayaguaya*", sung repeatedly. The lords of Cuzco dressed in the finery they had worn into battle. Everyone together, with the prisoners in the center, sang and celebrated for a month. Then it was time to return to Cuzco. The prisoners were paraded ahead and suffered great humiliation. The captains who had been sent along on parallel courses rejoined the main army at Xaquixaguana. There, a great fire was made before the Inca and some of the animals, fine clothing and maize taken in the course of campaigning were sacrificed in it. The captains brought the insignia and weapons and captured prisoners before Pachacuti and humbly begged him to tread on them. Then the same kind of tassels the Soras wore were brought to him and stepped on. The

prisoners taken by the other captains were dressed in long shirts and their hair was treated as the hair of the other prisoners had been. The captains from the Andes had brought many wild lowland animals, and Pachacuti ordered that these be given nothing to eat (Betanzos 1987, pt. 1, chps. 18-19: 90-95).

The next day, the entire army headed back to Cuzco. When they were in sight of the city, Pachacuti ordered the army to enter in a particular order. Each group was to sing of the things that had happened to it, beginning with Pachacuti and the Soras prisoners and the song that had already been composed. The prisoners were ordered to enter the city crying and singing of their crimes in loud voices and of how they were subjects and vassals of the son of the Sun, and that there were no forces strong enough to defeat him. The statue of the sun, the important *huacas* (sacred objects) and the bodies of the Inca forebears had been assembled in the main plaza. Pachacuti had the wild animals taken to the Cangaguase [Sanguaci]. The prisoners were closed in with them for three days, and if they survived, they were allowed to live but deprived of their estates and their positions and became servants of the statues and *huacas* there assembled. The insignias and arms and other things taken in battle were placed in a house known as Llaguaci, where other such trophies of battle were to be kept thereafter. Then the people who had gone with Pachacuti were brought before him. They were richly rewarded and were also given their share of the spoils. Pachacuti then named some of them to be lords (*señores*) of the provinces that had belonged to the enemies who had been eaten by the wild animals. Then it was time to rest (Betanzos 1987, pt. 1, chp. 19: 95-97).

Again, as in the campaign against the Chancas and their allies in Jaquixaguana, the emphasis is on ritual: both in connection with the march of Inca armies to war and with their victorious return. Practices related to the treatment of prisoners and spoils, including the development of prisons and museums for war trophies, may also be new. Proof of *capac* status was richly celebrated, and even the prisoners were made to sing their confirmation of it.

Pachacuti's later campaigns are not treated in the same detail in Betanzos as this one. Pachacuti participated in a campaign against the lord (*señor*) of Hatun Colla, who was calling himself *capac çapa apo indi chori*, which Betanzos glosses as "king and only lord, son of the Sun". Of course, this is the status that Pachacuti claimed (and that Uscovilca appears to have claimed before him). The description of Pachacuti's preparations for the campaign is brief; the battle is described in the same terms as the others, that is, it was fiercely fought by both sides, and lasted from morning til late afternoon. The lord of Hatun Colla was captured and killed. Pachacuti ordered his head to be "prepared in such a way that it would not be damaged", that is, preserved. The enemy dead were not to be interred. Instead, they were to be taken away from the battle site and left out in the open. On the site itself,

Pachacuti built a house for the sun and installed an image of the sun, to which he made great sacrifices. This was a different kind of memorial (Betanzos 1987, pt. 1, chp. 20: 100-101).<sup>5</sup>

The bodies of fallen Incas were gathered up and housed near the battle site while Pachacuti continued his campaign. The bodies were to be taken back to Cuzco. The Incas believed that the bodies of the dead would be resuscitated at some point. Betanzos describes this first in the Inca language and then translates the passage: "after this world ends all of the people have to rise up from it alive and in the same flesh, just as we are now" (1987, pt. 1, chp. 20: 101). Just what has been accommodated to the Christian idea of resurrection is unknown, but there was clearly some belief about a return to life that necessitated the preservation of the body. The preservation of Inca bodies and the destruction of enemy bodies -by serving as food for scavengers- had something to do with this corpus of belief.

The Colla prisoners were bound and marched back to Cuzco in the same way as the prisoners taken in the Soras campaign. The spoils were gathered up, including livestock, clothing, gold and silver ornaments, and service personnel. For the first time Betanzos supplies a term for what was taken after vanquishing an enemy: *piñas*. In Cuzco the prisoners were imprisoned in the Sangaguaci to be eaten by wild animals. The insignias and arms taken were sent to the Llaxaguaxi. The spoils were distributed in shares to the participants. The bodies of the Inca dead were preserved and given to their women and children, who also received shares in the spoils. Later, after everyone was ordered back to their lands to rest and relax, the Incas who were sent back with them to serve as administrators would see that these widows and children received their share of lands or other distributions made by the administrators, and they would receive them first, before any of the others (Betanzos 1987, pt. 1, chp. 20: 101-102).

After the defeat of the lord of Hatun Colla, other groups from the Lake Titicaca basin submitted peacefully, including the provinces of Chiquicache, Moho, Callavaya [Carabaya] and Asángaro (Betanzos 1987, pt. 1, chp. 20: 101-02). These groups would rebel at the time of his death and the rebellion would be put down by his son, a topic that will be treated below (in the section on Sarmiento).

This was the last time Pachacuti campaigned in person, and here the detailed treatment of campaigning stops. What Betanzos narrates about his campaigns clearly focuses on what this Inca invented, or at least elaborated from some pre-existing form. The creation of a statue to be taken into battle, the engineering projects, the invention of rituals associated with the transport of prisoners to Cuzco and their punishment there, the treatment of both

<sup>5</sup> Cieza de León describes a "temple of the sun" at Hatunqolla (1984, chp. 102: 279). Given that we know something about why this one was established in this place, it might be that such buildings were not "churches", but rather "war memorials".

enemy and Inca dead, the treatment of the widows and children of the Inca dead, and the invention of a special place to house the insignia and arms of the enemy all appear to have originated with Pachacuti. This Inca was interested in developing rituals and institutions. He had a hand in organizing what was remembered about his life, and the subject matter of the narrative unsurprisingly reflects his interests.

What we have read in Betanzos about the treatment of both the Inca and the enemy dead makes no reference to the consumption of human flesh, but it is a topic elsewhere in his narrative. He mentions it in his description of the campaign conducted by Thupa Inca in Andesuyo, to the northeast of Cuzco. Described as a place where it was so hot the people went naked and where it rained all the time, it is clear that Betanzos is describing a lowland region. These people engaged in warfare, but not with the aim of conquest. Those taken prisoner were taken to the captor's settlement where a great feast was held and they were eaten. A woman taken prisoner might live for some time, bearing one or more children, and then, when he felt like it, her husband would call his relatives together and they would eat her (Betanzos 1987, pt. 1, chp. 28: 134). Betanzos also describes cannibalism again in the time of Atahualpa, a descendant of the 11th Inca, who was engaged in a war with his brother Huascar on the eve of the Spanish arrival. To punish the Cañares who had collaborated with his brother, he had the hearts of their principal leaders cut into pieces and made their subjects eat them raw. Their bodies were given to the Quillaycingas, who lived in the lowlands to the east, to eat (Betanzos 1987, pt. 2, chp. 5: 216). Eating the flesh of captives was not Inca practice, but they lived near people who did this and who they might have relations with, and they might turn captives over to them to be eaten.<sup>6</sup>

Betanzos is our best source of information about Inca practice related to warfare. Certain ideas, like the ritualized movement of armies or the gathering of insignia in a special building in Cuzco may indicate a certain institutionalization of practice, Betanzos also informs us of how different situations were handled, indicating that Inca leaders could invent ritual acts to suit particular cases.

### **Sarmiento on Inca Warfare**

What Betanzos wrote is closer to an Inca perspective than any other historical narrative we have. Sarmiento appears to have used one of the same sources -the life history of Pachacuti- but he compiled his history using other sources as well, and his own canons of historical writing influenced his choices (Julien 2000a: 123-25). For instance, he added information about the

<sup>6</sup> This was something that went on after the Spaniards arrived. Titu Cusi mentions that he turned some Spaniards over to the "Moyomoyos Andes" to be eaten. This is a reference to the Antis, a people living in the lowlands east of Cuzco (Yupanqui 1992: 49).

conquests of Thupa Inca, the 10th Inca in the dynastic line, taken from *quipos* (knot records) kept by his descendants. These were basically lists of fortresses and captains defeated by this Inca. Why the Incas kept such a list is unknown. When Sarmiento adds this list to his Inca history, he is bringing it into line with European conceptions of history, which highlight battles and conquests. The synchronization of source materials into a single time frame is also Sarmiento's. For that reason, material from the *quipo* source first appears during the lifetime of Pachacuti, since Thupa Inca began to campaign before he succeeded his father. I will examine what Sarmiento had to say about Inca campaigning north of Soras in light of what the Toledo witnesses from Huringuancas said, and look briefly at the Colla rebellion at the time of Pachacuti's death.

The Inca campaign north of Soras was led by Pachacuti's brother, Capac Yupanqui (Sarmiento de Gamboa 1906, chp. 35: 74). One of his captains was Anco Aylo, a Chanca who had remained in Cuzco since the time of the Inca invasion. The Inca army was made up of contingents from different groups, and each group was customarily led by a captain from that group. When the army was ready to march, the Inca gave his captain-general weapons of gold. Presumably, these were the sorts of special weapons and insignias each side brought into battle and that became trophies if that side lost. Other captains also received weapons from the hand of the Inca. One of the fortresses that offered resistance was Urcocollac, near Parcos. What follows is a story about the desertion of Anco Aylo and the failure of Capac Yupanqui to obey Pachacuti's orders not to conquer north of Guaylas (Sarmiento de Gamboa 1906, chp. 38: 77-78). What Sarmiento has to say about the fortresses conquered north of Soras comes from the *quipo* source. The material is inserted into a single paragraph:

In the province of the Quicchuas [Quichuas] he conquered and took the fortress of Tohara and Cayara and the fortress of Curamba; in the Angarares, the fortress of Urcocolla and Guayllapucara and captured their cinche named Chuquis Guaman; in the province of Jauja, Siquilla Pucara, and in the province of Guayllas [Guaylas], Chungomarca Pillaguamaraca...(Sarmiento de Gamboa 1906, chp. 44: 87).

There are problems with Sarmiento's sequencing of this material, but what we want to note is that the list includes a fortress in Jauja where the people resisted.

The *quipo* source focuses on resistance. There was a major effort to resist the Incas (Cieza de León 1986, chp. XLIX: 143), perhaps at Siquilla Pucara, as noted in the *quipo* list. The information we have from the Huringuanca witnesses is not about this battle, but about peaceful submission, reviewed in the next section. These individuals were, after all, descended from those



individuals the Incas chose as *curacas*. It is unlikely that those who fought the Incas were rewarded in this way.

The other campaign of interest here is the campaign fought by Thupa Inca against the Collas after Pachacuti's death. The rebellion broke out while Thupa Inca was campaigning in the lowlands east of Cuzco, engaged in the conquest of the Antis, in what became the province of Opatari. They were led by a *cinche* named Condin Xabana, who was said to be "a great sorcerer and exchanger and they believed -and even now affirm- that he could transform himself into diverse forms". Sarmiento describes other regions in the lowlands that were annexed during this campaign (1906, chp. 49: 95-96).

While still engaged in the lowlands, one of the Collas in his company fled to the Lake Titicaca region and spread the rumor that Thupa Inca was dead. His name was Coaquiri, but he took the name Pachacuti Inca. The Collas took him as their captain. When Thupa Inca heard the news, he left the lowland campaign in the hands of a captain and headed straight for the Lake region. Thupa Inca enlarged his army, naming a few new captains, and went to where the Collas had fortified themselves at Llallagua, Asillo, Arapa and Pucara. He captured the Colla captains, Chuca Chuca and Pachacuti Coaquiri, and "made drums of them". This campaign lasted "for years", during which Thupa Inca carried out "great cruelties" (Sarmiento de Gamboa 1906, chps 49-50: 96-97).

The places named are located in the region that had submitted peacefully to his father after the conquest of Hatuncolla (Sarmiento de Gamboa 1906, chp. 50: 97). What we find in other source materials is that this region was organized into provinces that were part of the estate of Thupa Inca and the sun (Rostworowski de Diez Canseco 1993: 269). There are similar links between the defeat -and virtual extermination of peoples- in the Urubamba valley by Pachacuti and estates that later belonged to that Inca in Pisac. Extermination or near-extirmination of the people occupying a territory may have paved the way for the development of these types of Inca holdings. Both cases involved people who had been Inca subjects and then rebelled, and one case specifically involved people who had first submitted peacefully to the Incas (Julien 2000c: 70-71). The provinces created in this manner -as is evident by the dedication of some of the territory to the cult of the sun- were similar in nature to provinces that were dedicated to particular *huacas*. There may have been a special type of property that could be privately held by the Incas and other supernaturals. The Incas and Sun may have gained these private holdings through warfare (Julien 2000a: 265-266).

Sarmiento adds important details to our understanding of Inca warfare. So do the witnesses interviewed in the Toledo *Informaciones*.

## **The *Informaciones*: Non-Inca Witnesses on Inca Warfare**

Some of the witnesses interviewed in the toledan inquiry were from places like Soras, that had been conquered in the time of Pachacuti. These people uniformly said that it had been Pachacuti who annexed their territory. When the same questions were asked in Jauja, those interviewed said that it had been Thupa Inca. The witnesses knew more about the specifics of the Inca conquest than they did about Inca genealogy. When asked about the Inca dynastic line, they knew only about the more recent Incas. One witness even said that Pachacuti was the son of Manco Capac. They had heard of Capac Yupanqui, Pachacuti's brother, who had been put to death because he had conquered too far north. The witnesses said that he had been ordered to go no farther than Vilcas (not Yanamayo, in Hatun Guayllas as Sarmiento wrote, 1906, chp. 38, p. 78), and they may have been right.

All of the witnesses noted that they were offered a choice between peaceful submission and fighting. Most said the Inca fought until the people submitted, but Don Alonso Quia Guanaco, from Parinacochas, gave a very specific idea of what Inca policy had been:

When they resisted for a few days, the Incas put all of them, large and small, to the knife, and when this was seen and understood by the rest of the people, they submitted out of fear (f. 51).

Another witness, Don Joan Puyquin, whose father had been from a town named Pia near Quito, said that his father, Poyquin, had been the only person the Inca left alive among his people who had all been killed in the conquest "because they had resisted him". His father was spared because "he had been very young" (*por ser muy muchacho*) and was taken as a servant by Thupa Inca (ff. 58-58v, 60). One of the Inca witnesses, Don Juan Sona, interviewed at Mayo in the valley of Xaquixaguana, said that the Inca regularly killed all of the people and that "the only ones left alive were the very small boys".

Killing all of the people would not have suited the Inca's purposes, so these episodes of killing a population down to the last combatant had to have been strategically timed and dramatically accomplished to achieve the best effect among those who had not submitted.

The best testimony about submission was given by Don Alonso Pomaguala, of Huringuancas, who testified that he had learned about the Inca conquest of the region from his father Guamia Chiguala and his grandfather Xaxaguaman, "who were caciques named by the Inca". Both had told him that "they had been with the Inca in the conquest of this land" (f. 17). Elsewhere he notes that his great-grandfather, named Capoguala, had negotiated Huringuanca submission to Thupa Inca. Thupa Inca had installed himself on a local mountain top in Huringuancas with a *huno* (unit of 10,000) soldiers. Capoguala, "one of the *cincheconas*", went with 10 of his soldiers to meet with the Inca. His people were told to hide and see what befell this

embassy. What happened is that the Inca gave his great-grandfather some "ornately-decorated shirts and cloaks, and the kind of cups they drink from called *aquillas*". The term *aquilla* refers to a cup made of precious metal, and without the qualifier *qori* (gold), to a silver cup (González Holguín 1952: 689). Those who were hiding first thought the Inca was coming to kill them when they saw the embassy return, but rejoiced when they recognized their own leaders. Capoguala led his people to where the Inca was and they swore their obedience to him. From this group, Thupa Inca recruited an army to continue north with him to Ecuador (ff. 19v-20). Pomaguala noted that others who had not submitted to Inca authority had been defeated in battle, or had been tied up and their lands taken from them (*atando a algunos e tomandoles sus tierras*) (ff. 19v-20).

What is interesting to note is that the Incas chose a fortified site as a negotiating point. This choice seems to indicate that the Incas offered the people a choice between submission or attacking a fortified position. This was not much of a choice, but then, the Incas could not afford to lose. If they did, the loss was proof that they were not *quipo*. One witness, Don Roldan Matara, a cacique from Cotabambas (southwest of Cuzco) gave the usual statement to the effect that those who did not peacefully submit and chose to defend themselves were killed and treated with great cruelty. He added that some peoples submitted because they were afraid of what would happen if they did not, but also because the Inca said "he was son of the sun" (f. 65). Like Don Felipe Poma Macao, he noted that those who submitted "went with the Inca, helping him to conquer and annex these lands" (f. 65).

### **The Informaciones: Spanish Witnesses on Inca Warfare**

The Spaniards interviewed by Toledo did not have much to say about the Inca expansion except in very general terms. What they did remember were the gruesome details: visual memories of the bodies and body parts of Inca enemies that were still to be seen in Inca possession or on the landscape. For example, Juan de Pancorvo, one of the Spaniards who arrived in Cuzco with Francisco Pizarro, remembered a hillside about a day away from Cuzco where Atahualpa's general Challcochima had left some 50 to 100 *duhos* (small benches on which lords sat). The display symbolized all of the lords Challcochima had killed (f. 129v).

The person who had seen the most was Alonso de Mesa, who had also come with Pizarro. While he had been in Cajamarca, ten or twelve *caciques* from Chachapoyas had been brought to Atahualpa there. Atahualpa had them taken to a corral and had them killed by blows to the head with stones. Mesa also remembered seeing human drums:

When they took captains or *cincheconas* who had distinguished themselves in battle or individuals the Inca suspected might want to rebel, they were killed. Leaving the arms and the head whole,

and removing the bones from their bodies and filling their bellies with ash, they were turned into drums. Their hands and heads were hung above the drum, and when the wind blew, they played themselves (f. 131).

Mesa also noted that he had entered an Inca house and seen a head that had been made into a cup. The brains had been removed and the interior had been lined with gold. In the mouth was a gold straw. He took this head to Francisco Pizarro, where Atahualpa was eating, and the Inca told him: "this is the head of a brother of mine who went to war against me; he had said he was going to drink from my head, but I killed him and now I drink from his". This said, Atahualpa had the head filled with *chichq* (maize beer) and drank from it.

### **War, or Peace at any Price**

We have isolated various voices in the written sources, and we have tried to keep in mind whatever constraints and biases might have affected them. In some cases translators and editors were involved. In others, those behind their creation had agendas hostile toward the very people who were being asked to provide information. We can expect that such sources favor a representation of the Incas as tyrannical and aggressive, hence, an author like Sarmiento would add source material about the taking of fortresses and other military engagements where an author like Betanzos would present other aspects of military campaigns more in line with what the Incas thought was important to remember. How the armies move -both to and from sites where armed conflict occurred- and the treatment of prisoners far eclipse any description of what occurred on the battlefield. What was most often noted about battle was its duration, and since even the most important battles lasted less than a day, one has to wonder whether what was officially remembered had more than a tenuous relationship to actual events. We have to read Sarmiento carefully, with his biases in mind, and let Betanzos and the Toledo witnesses speak more forcefully. When we read Betanzos we also need to take into account that we are dealing with memory, a selection process that introduces other types of bias. In the end, the written sources are less amenable to eliciting an understanding of warfare than what could be learned from living people. That said, the written sources make up for their defects in part by giving us a perspective on warfare across a longer span of time than is usually the case with ethnographic information.

Our reading of the written sources provokes some general observations on warfare. Taking into consideration that Inca voices are louder than the others, it is none the less apparent that what had been a much more informal practice -with leaders chosen as the need arose, whose power depended on performance -developed into something more formal- where leadership was enshrined by victory and ritual display became an important element in

achieving present and future victories. Indeed, it is the development of ritual practices and institutions that is most notable when the Incas tell us something about warfare.

We can learn something about the nature of disputes before the Inca expansion but little about the conduct of war. There were disputes over minor matters like gathering kindling on someone else's land; raids for movable property and women; serious attempts to remove people from their lands-prompting the residents to flee or face decimation -and there were campaigns to force people into alliance with more powerful groups, perhaps for common defense. There may have been rules of engagement -for example, fighting may have only taken place during the daylight hours, given what Betanzos tells us about Inca battles. We learn more about leadership. Perhaps the most important thing we learn is that *cinchecona* status was not hereditary, although there was some expectation of its transmission down the generations. *Cinchecona* status was a practical matter that had to be demonstrated in armed engagements.

Although the witnesses did not compare *cinchecona* and *capac* status, we can. The Incas claimed *capac* status and tell us that there were others in the Andes who made similar claims. *Capac* status appears to have been linked with a solar supernatural and was calculated genealogically. Not only the person who proved that they were *capac* by emerging victorious on the battlefield, but a whole group of people had a vested interest in maintaining and preserving this status. Warfare was a test of *capac* status, so a large investment was made in obtaining victories. The Incas must have shown prowess during engagements with those who decided to fight them -though we can find very little in the written sources about skill or ferocity (except at times when the ferocity of women is mentioned). What we learn about is the invention of ritual displays. The Incas -like the Chancas before them- used a certain marching formation that represented the march of the sun across the sky. Presumably, this movement reflected the claim to some kind of genealogical tie to this supernatural. A victory -and their army had to be victorious- allowed them an opportunity to create a performance that would again reflect their *capac* status. The Sangaguaci, or place where prisoners were fed to wild animals, and the Llaxahuaci, or place where war trophies were displayed, were reminders to the important elites who visited Cuzco of the demonstrations of *capac* status. Other memorials were left at battle sites for the same purpose. Like the Chanca lord who was delighted when presented with the opportunity for an easy victory, the Incas needed to fight and win, but an easy victory was a great gift, because a lot was lost if an army suffered defeat. The Incas needed to fight and win -on occasion. Peaceful submission and the subsequent enlargement of the Inca army, was also a great gift. While we cannot say how frequent the choice between war and peace was offered before the time of the Inca expansion, we can be more certain that this choice was a fundamental part of the Inca conquest. Peace,

in these circumstances, involved submission in some form. When the Inca came to a territory he wanted to incorporate into the empire, found a defensible site where the army could wait, and then waited for the people to decide whether they wanted war or peace, he was probably relieved when a delegation came to offer obedience. At the same time, the army needed at least one big, showy battle for the performance on the way home.

One subject that was mentioned both in the Inca historical narratives and by Spanish witnesses is the treatment of the dead. We do not have any information that suggests that the Incas consumed the flesh of enemy dead, as has been noted for other parts of South America at different times and places (Caillavet 1996; Conklin 2001). The Incas may not have consumed the flesh of enemy dead, but the bodies of people who died in battle were still something of great importance. Destruction of the body -which is what the eating of human remains accomplishes- was something that the Incas carried out on the bodies of those who had fought them. In some cases, the bodies became food -the food of wild animals. We have references to the Incas turning prisoners over to people in the lowlands east of Cuzco, so that they would be cut into pieces and eaten. We do not know much about Inca ideas about resuscitation (and this term was used in the documents and is to be preferred to the term resurrection, given the obvious Christian associations of the latter). The more important enemy dead were preserved, though usually not the entire body. An important adversary might have his head made into a drinking cup or his body into a drum. What did this mean in terms of ideas about later resuscitation? Given an Inca emphasis on destroying those who resisted them -possibly because retaliation was something that could be expected, no matter how much time had elapsed- the destruction of the body might prevent retaliation in some distant and very different future. Since there was also a connection between exterminating a population and taking its land, perhaps the destruction of bodies was part of eliminating claims to the land that could be substantiated by a mummy.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Lineages were land-holding corporations -at least those in the Cuzco region- and the preservation of mummified ancestors may have been related to maintaining title to the land. There are only hints of this in what was written about the Incas. For example, during the civil war between Atahualpa and Guascar, Atahualpa's generals exterminated many members of his Thupa Inca's *panaca*, because his *panaca* (lineage) supported Guascar's cause. They also burned the mummy of Thupa Inca (Sarmiento de Gamboa 1906, chp. 66: 122-123). Destroying the mummy may have cleared the way for Atahualpa to take over the lands of his *panaca*. So was killing everyone. Some of the very young were left alive and their descendants were the "Incas *nietos*" who presented the *quipu* of the conquests of their forebear Thupa Inca. At the same time as this *quipu* was presented, information was taken from various witnesses. One, Don Martín Nadpe Yupangui, of the *panaca* of Viracocha Inca, reiterated what Sarmiento said about the generals of Atahualpa having killed the parents of the petitioners and mentioned that they were poor because they had been too young to keep the Spaniards from taking their *panaca* lands (Rowe 1985: 201-202, 231).

There is a great deal more to know about how the practice of war was embedded in Andean societies. We end knowing less than we might want to know. There was more to the story then, but considering the time that has elapsed since the information was gathered, we end knowing quite a lot.

### **Abstract**

*From interview transcripts and other written sources drawn from native testimony about warfare, an image can be developed of the conduct of war in the Inca heartland just before and during the Inca expansion. Captains, or cinchecona, were chosen when needed for defense. These individuals were successful as leaders in armed conflict. Their descendants were expected to possess the same qualities, but these had none the less to be demonstrated. What marked the Inca expansion was a contest among groups who claimed to be capaccuna. This status was hereditary: not just the captain but those connected through a genealogical tie shared. Capac status also had to be demonstrated through success in armed conflict, so the Incas needed a showy victory each time they campaigned. Their interests were better served, however, if most of the peoples they encountered on their campaigns submitted without engaging them in battle. Peace was a by-product of submission, under these circumstances.*

*Our sources are biased in favor of the period of Inca expansion, but a general trend toward the development of ritual practices and institutions related to warfare is evident. Inca accounts of their successes stress the movement of their armies, the handling of captives and booty, the celebration afterward of a successful campaign -both on the road and in Cuzco, and the treatment of Inca and enemy dead, all suggest that the institutionalization of success in a single group led to a formalization of the practices related to warfare.*

### **Resumen**

*Partiendo de transcripciones de entrevistas y de otras fuentes escritas, derivadas del testimonio indígena acerca de la guerra, uno puede formarse una idea de cómo se llevaban las campañas bélicas en el epicentro del territorio inca, justo antes y durante la expansión inca. Los capitanes de guerra, o cinchecona, eran elegidos cuando se los necesitaban para la defensa del grupo; se trataba, en todo caso, de líderes que tenían que probar su condición en conflictos armados. Se esperaba que sus descendientes exhibieran las mismas cualidades, pero éstas tenían que ser demostradas.*

*Lo que marcó la expansión inca fue la contienda entre grupos que reivindicaban el estatus de capaccuna; era hereditario, no sólo en el caso de los capitanes de guerra, sino también en el caso de aquéllos que estaban conectados por vínculos genealógicos compartidos. El estatus de capac también*

*tenía que ser demostrado por medio de una campaña bélica exitosa. Los Incas necesitaban entonces una victoria ostentosa cada vez que hacían campaña. Sin embargo, sus intereses eran mejor servidos si la mayoría de los pueblos que encontraban en sus campañas se sometía sin que tuvieran que batallarlos. En esta circunstancia, la paz constituía un derivado de la sumisión.*

*Nuestras fuentes muestran una clara predisposición hacia el período de la expansión inca. En ella se observa una tendencia general hacia el desarrollo de prácticas rituales y de instituciones relacionadas con la guerra. Los relatos que hacen los Incas de sus éxitos, enfatizan los movimientos de sus ejércitos, el tratamiento de los presos y del botín de guerra, las celebraciones después de una campaña exitosa, y el tratamiento de los muertos incas y a los enemigos. Todo ello sugiere que la institucionalización del éxito en determinado grupo llevaba a la formación de las prácticas relacionadas con la guerra.*

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